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How the Federal Courts Opened the 
Door to Impeaching Criminal 
Defendants With Prior Convictions 
Jeffrey Bellin∗ 
This Article spotlights the flawed analytical framework at the heart of the 
federal courts’ approach to one of the most controversial trial practices in 
American criminal jurisprudence — the admission of prior convictions to 
impeach the credibility of defendants who testify.  As the Article explains, 
the flawed approach is a byproduct of the courts’ reliance on a five-factor 
analytical framework to implement the governing legal standard enacted by 
Congress in Federal Rule of Evidence 609.  Tracing the evolution of the five-
factor framework from its roots in pre-Rule 609 case law, the Article 
demonstrates that the courts’ reinterpretation of the framework in recent 
years has, by judicial fiat, transformed Rule 609.  Rather than the obstacle 
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to the admission of prior convictions that Congress intended, Rule 609 has 
become a conduit for their routine admission. 
The Article concludes by proposing an alternative analytical framework 
designed to realign the federal case law on this critical subject with the 
governing congressional intent.  In the absence of such a reform, the 
federal courts’ erroneous analysis will continue to alter the course of 
countless criminal trials by unnecessarily deterring defendants from 
testifying and improperly penalizing those who do take the witness stand. 
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most significant rulings in a criminal case is the 
determination that a defendant who intends to take the witness stand 
may (or may not) be impeached with a prior conviction.1  Indeed, 
when prior conviction2 impeachment is permitted, defendants often 
decline to testify at all, fearing that once the jury is aware of their 
criminal record, it will conclude the defendant “is the kind of [person] 
who would commit the crime” or, even worse, “that he ought to be 
put away without too much concern with present guilt.”3   
 
 1 See Richard D. Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence:  Psycho-Bayesian [!?] 
Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 639 (1991) (recognizing that 
“prosecutors offer . . . [prior conviction impeachment] evidence very frequently, and 
both sides recognize its potency and often litigate its admissibility with great vigor”); 
Victor Gold, Impeachment by Conviction Evidence:  Judicial Discretion and the Politics of 
Rule 609, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2297, 2310 n.74 (1994) (ascribing “the 
extraordinary amount of congressional interest” in federal rule governing impeachment 
of testifying defendants to fact that impeachment decision “significantly affects the 
outcome of criminal trials”); Alan D. Hornstein, Between Rock and a Hard Place:  The 
Right to Testify and Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1997) 
(noting that “[i]f the jury learns that a defendant previously has been convicted of a 
crime, the probability of conviction increases dramatically”); L. Timothy Perrin, Pricking 
Boils, Preserving Error:  On The Horns of a Dilemma After Ohler v. United States, 34 UC 
DAVIS L. REV. 615, 651-52 (2001) (noting that “[t]he available empirical data 
demonstrate that the admission of a prior conviction has an explosive impact on the 
jury, substantially increasing the likelihood that the jury will convict the defendant of 
the charged crime,” and consequently “the admission at trial of a criminal defendant’s 
prior convictions often spells doom for a criminal defendant”). 
 2 The phrase “prior conviction” has been criticized as redundant in this context 
because any potentially admissible conviction will necessarily have occurred prior to a 
witness’s testimony.  See James Duane, Prior Convictions and Tuna Fish, 7 SCRIBES J. 
LEGAL WRITING 160, 161 (2000).  While there is some merit to this criticism, this 
Article sacrifices potential style points for clarity in utilizing the arguably redundant 
phrasing, which is, after all, “lodged in our legal lexicon.”  Id. at 162.  The standard 
formulation, while at times rhetorical overkill, eliminates ambiguity that might arise 
when a qualifier (e.g., “prior,” “felony,” or “criminal”) is omitted.  For example, a 
Quaker on trial for heresy or a sociopath attempting to avoid the death penalty would 
wisely endeavor to suppress evidence of their “convictions” (i.e., fixed or strong 
beliefs, see AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 292 (New College ed. 1976)), despite not 
having any criminal record. 
 3 Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 482 n.11 (1972) (quoting 1 MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 43, at 93 (1954)); see also Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal 
Procedure and Constitutional Law:  Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again, 74 N.C. L. 
REV. 1559, 1632 (1996) (“The principal reason why defendants refuse to take the 
stand is that they fear impeachment with prior convictions — a fear with strong 
support from the empirical evidence.”); R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and 
Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 58 (1981) (arguing that “innocent 
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Commentators have long criticized the practice of impeaching 
testifying defendants with prior convictions, citing the questionable 
relevance of past crimes to witness credibility and the virtual certainty 
that their admission will lead to unfair prejudice.4  This chorus of 
disapproval has had little practical effect, however.  The admission of 
prior convictions is now a well established and virtually routine part 
of federal (and most state) criminal proceedings in which a defendant 
with a criminal record takes the witness stand.5 
 
defendants in many American jurisdictions are deterred from testifying by the unjust 
practice of allowing prior convictions to be routinely admitted to impeach a 
defendant’s credibility”); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American 
Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 482 (1992) (noting that “[t]he threat of 
felony conviction impeachment can be a powerful deterrent to taking the witness 
stand” and citing empirical evidence that “a defendant [i]s almost three times more 
likely to refuse to testify if he ha[s] a criminal record than if not”); cf. Ohler v. United 
States, 529 U.S. 753, 759 (2000) (recognizing that potential use of prior convictions as 
impeachment “may deter a defendant from taking the stand”). 
 4 See James Beaver & Steven Marques, A Proposal to Modify the Rule on Criminal 
Conviction Impeachment, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 585, 604 (1985); Teree E. Foster, Rule 609(A) 
in the Civil Context:  A Recommendation for Reform, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1988) 
(stating that “[n]o rule of evidence has provoked commentary so passionate or 
profuse as that which permits impeachment of a testifying witness in a criminal case 
by introducing that witness’ previous convictions”); Gold, supra note 1, at 2295-96 
(“No provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence has sparked more controversy than 
Rule 609, which deals with the admissibility of convictions to impeach a witness.”); 
Hornstein, supra note 1, at 10; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Prior Crime Impeachment of 
Criminal Defendants:  A Constitutional Analysis of Rule 609, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 391, 394 
(1980) (recognizing practice of impeaching criminal defendant with prior conviction 
as “one of the most seriously debated issues of evidence law”); Perrin, supra note 1, at 
652; discussion infra Part I.  The Supreme Court has identified Dean Ladd’s 1940 
article criticizing the impeachment of criminal defendants (and other witnesses) with 
prior convictions as a “seminal article” in this area.  See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. 
Co., 490 U.S. 504, 512 n.11 (1989) (citing Mason Ladd, Credibility Tests — Current 
Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 176, 191 (1940)). 
 5 See Beaver & Marques, supra note 4, at 591 (stating that despite passage of 
Federal Rules, “[p]rior crime impeachment of criminal defendant-witnesses continues 
essentially unabated” and noting famed study by Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel 
that “nationwide, juries learn of defendants’ criminal records in seventy-two percent 
of the cases in which defendants testify in their own behalf”); John Blume, The 
Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record — Lessons from the Wrongfully 
Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 484-86 n.28 (forthcoming 2008), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014181 (explaining that state and federal rules limiting 
prior conviction impeachment are “honored in the breach” and that any required 
balancing of probative value versus prejudice “is routinely struck in favor of 
impeachment”); Mirjan R. Damaska, Propensity Evidence in Continental Legal Systems, 
70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55, 59 (1994) (contrasting continental European jurisdictions 
with “common law jurisdictions . . . where prior convictions are routinely used to 
impeach the accused who decides to testify in his own defense”); Greenawalt, supra 
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As this Article explains, the federal courts are not merely out of step 
with commentators on this issue, but have also diverged from the 
intent of Congress.  The now-prevailing practice is patently 
inconsistent with the controlling legal standard — Federal Rule of 
Evidence 609.  On its face, Rule 609 is unflinchingly hostile to the use 
of prior convictions as impeachment of criminal defendants.  The Rule 
allows the introduction of most convictions only if “the [trial] court 
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect.”6  This prerequisite to admissibility, an 
unweighted balancing of prejudice versus probative value, should 
favor the defense in the overwhelming majority of cases.7  Instead, a 
reflexive approach to admitting defendants’ prior convictions has 
become the norm.8 
This Article attempts to explain the pronounced divergence between 
the federal courts’ routine admission of defendants’ prior convictions 
and the congressional intent underlying Rule 609 that such evidence 
be strictly limited.9  The Article traces this phenomenon to a three-
decade-long trend in the federal courts toward replacing the facially 
anti-impeachment text of the Rule with a decidedly pro-impeachment, 
five-factor analytical framework that places an almost insurmountable 
burden on defendants attempting to exclude prior convictions.10  In 
 
note 3, at 58 (decrying “the unjust practice” in American jurisdictions “of allowing 
prior convictions to be routinely admitted to impeach a defendant’s credibility”); 
Hornstein, supra note 1, at 4-5 (recognizing that “the lower courts more or less 
routinely admit[] [prior convictions] for impeachment” of testifying criminal 
defendants); Nichol, supra note 4, at 394, 399 (stating that despite “academic fervor” 
criticizing practice of prior conviction impeachment of criminal defendants has been 
“largely unabated under the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence”); infra Part 
IV (canvassing federal case law applying Rule 609). 
 6 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). 
 7 See infra Part II.B. 
 8 See infra Part IV.C; infra note 162. 
 9 See FED. R. EVID. 609 (indicating congressional intent that prior convictions 
should only be used in limited circumstances); infra Part II. 
 10 As discussed in greater detail below, the federal appellate courts instruct district 
courts as follows: 
[I]n determining whether the probative value of admitting a prior conviction 
outweighs its prejudicial effect, the court should consider:  ‘(1) the 
impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) the point in time of the 
conviction and the defendant’s subsequent history; (3) the similarity 
between the past crime and the charged crime; (4) the importance of the 
defendant’s testimony; and (5) the centrality of the credibility issue.’   
United States v. Gant, 396 F.3d 906, 909 (7th Cir. 2005); see also infra Part III 
(discussing this five-factor framework); cases cited infra note 110 (cataloging use of 
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effect, this judge-created framework designed to interpret Rule 609 
has instead supplanted it.  As a consequence, the federal approach to 
prior conviction impeachment has become the opposite of what 
Congress intended. 
Part I of the Article provides the context for the analysis to follow, 
demonstrating the broad significance of prior conviction impeachment 
rulings — one of only a handful of potentially dispositive evidentiary 
rulings governing criminal trials.  Part II sketches the legislative 
history of Rule 609, depicting Congress’s intent that the Rule, as 
finally enacted, strictly curtail admission of defendants’ prior 
convictions.  Part III documents how the federal courts have strayed 
from congressional intent by relying on a fundamentally flawed, 
judicially crafted five-factor framework to apply the Rule.  Part IV 
demonstrates that the framework, as currently applied, leads to the 
virtually automatic admissibility of prior convictions as impeachment.  
Finally, Part V proposes an alternative analytical approach to the 
application of Rule 609 that is designed to realign the federal case law 
with the controlling congressional intent. 
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIOR CONVICTION IMPEACHMENT OF 
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
It has long been established in the vast majority of American 
jurisdictions that criminal defendants who take the witness stand, like 
all other witnesses, are subject to general credibility impeachment 
through the introduction of evidence of their prior convictions.11  This 
 
this framework in federal circuits). 
 11 See United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1275 (5th Cir. 1977) (recognizing 
“criticism” of practice of impeaching criminal defendants with prior convictions, but 
noting that it “is firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence”); United States v. Garber, 
471 F.2d 212, 215-16 (5th Cir. 1972) (emphasizing that although prior conviction 
impeachment has been “persistently criticized” it is “firmly entrenched in criminal 
justice procedures” and “generally accepted as fair and proper”); 1 MCCORMICK ON 
EVIDENCE § 42, at 198 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006) (noting argument 
that impeachment of accused must be permitted because “it is misleading to permit 
the accused to appear as a witness of blameless life” has “prevailed widely”); Nichol, 
supra note 4, at 391 (recognizing practice as “time-honored tenet of our evidentiary 
jurisprudence”). 
The Supreme Court of Hawaii holds a contrary view and has ruled that “to convict a 
criminal defendant where prior crimes have been introduced to impeach his 
credibility as a witness violates the accused’s constitutional right to testify in his own 
defense.”  State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 661 (Haw. 1971).  A handful of states have 
adopted Hawaii’s approach in generally barring impeachment of testifying defendants 
with prior convictions.  See Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with Federal Rule Of 
Evidence 609:  A Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE 
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practice of impeaching the credibility of criminal defendants with 
prior convictions has been aptly characterized as “one of the most 
controversial in the law of evidence.”12  The controversy stems from 
the fact that, while the rationale behind the practice is far from 
compelling, all sides agree that it has a devastating effect on 
defendants who testify (or decline to do so to avoid impeachment). 
Prosecutors routinely fight to preserve their ability to introduce a 
defendant’s prior convictions as impeachment evidence.13  In response, 
criminal defense attorneys endeavor to moot the potential impeachment 
by convincing defendants with a criminal record to refrain from 
testifying.14  These tactical positions reflect the “overwhelming 
consensus”15 of legal commentators and practitioners that prior 
conviction impeachment has an “explosive impact on the jury,” 
“significantly affect[ing] the outcome of criminal trials,”16 and often 
“spell[ing] doom for a criminal defendant.”17  The available empirical 
data support this consensus, demonstrating that admission of a 
defendant’s prior convictions “substantially increase[s] the likelihood 
that the jury will convict the defendant of the charged crime.”18 
 
L. REV. 1, 51 (1999) (citing Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Georgia, and Montana as 
sole jurisdictions that depart from general rule permitting such impeachment). 
 12 See Foster, supra note 4, at 1-2.   
 13 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 11, § 42, at 198 (noting that “[m]ost 
prosecutors argue” that impeachment should be permitted because “it is misleading to 
permit the accused to appear as a witness of blameless life”); Friedman, supra note 1, 
at 639 (recognizing that “prosecutors offer . . . [prior conviction impeachment] 
evidence very frequently, and both sides recognize its potency and often litigate its 
admissibility with great vigor”); Mason Ladd, Credibility Tests — Current Trends, 89 
U. PA. L. REV. 166, 190 (1940) (asserting that potential to introduce defendant’s 
criminal record as impeachment “is something never missed by the prosecuting 
attorney”).   
 14 See Beaver & Marques, supra note 4, at 606 (reporting survey of defense 
attorneys finding that 98% “believed that it was impossible for the limiting 
instruction” requiring juries to consider prior convictions solely as impeachment “to 
be effective”); Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 482 (noting that defendants with criminal 
record are almost three times more likely to refuse to testify). 
 15 Beaver & Marques, supra note 4, at 604. 
 16 See Gold, supra note 1, at 2297 n.74. 
 17 Perrin, supra note 1, at 651; see also Hornstein, supra note 1, at 1-2 (“If the jury 
learns that a defendant previously has been convicted of a crime, the probability of 
conviction increases dramatically.”); Ladd, supra note 13, at 186 (arguing that admission 
of prior conviction “may be the turning point of the case to the untrained mind”). 
 18 Perrin, supra note 1, at 651-52; see also Beaver & Marques, supra note 4, at 604-
06 (summarizing juror studies and concluding that “[e]mpirical data . . .  indicate that 
the admission of evidence of prior crimes is so highly prejudicial that it often may be 
decisive in determining the jury’s verdict”). 
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Scholarly commentary in the modern era has resolutely derided 
prior conviction impeachment as a mean-spirited penalty imposed on 
criminal defendants — nothing more than a thinly veiled effort by 
prosecutors (condoned by “law and order” courts and legislators) to 
introduce otherwise prohibited evidence of a defendant’s criminal 
propensities through the back door of credibility impeachment.19  In 
light of this strident and often one-sided characterization of prior 
conviction impeachment,20 it is necessary to situate the practice in its 
historical context to develop a meaningful appreciation of its place in 
American jurisprudence. 
The roots of the practice of impeachment with prior convictions can 
be traced to English common law, which categorically barred 
witnesses previously convicted of a felony (or other “infamous crime”) 
from testifying.21  Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, these and other disqualifications of witness classes gradually 
disappeared in American jurisdictions.  This trend culminated in the 
Supreme Court’s pronouncement in 1918, as “the conviction of [the] 
time,” that “the truth is more likely to be arrived at by hearing the 
testimony of all persons of competent understanding who may seem to 
have knowledge of the facts involved in a case, leaving the credit and 
weight of such testimony to be determined by the jury.”22 
The statutory reforms that abolished the testimonial disqualification 
of felons and other classes of witnesses nevertheless retained some of 
the spirit of the common law tradition by permitting the credibility of 
 
 19 See, e.g., Beaver & Marques, supra note 4, at 607, 619 (arguing that permitting 
impeachment “effectively allows the government to influence the jury on the issue of 
guilt with evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law” and advocating abolition of 
practice); Nichol, supra note 4, at 403, 409 (noting perception that “prosecutors often 
use past conviction evidence hoping that jurors will be unable to follow the 
instructions of the court” and contending that “[p]rior crime impeachment . . . serves 
no legitimate interest in the conduct of federal criminal trials”); H. Richard Uviller, 
Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct:  Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice in the Courtroom, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 868 (1982) (suggesting that “the impeachment rubric is a 
hoax, merely a cover for the admission of evidence bearing on propensity — which is 
what the rule’s defenders are probably seeking”). 
 20 Even some commentators who generally believe that criminal defendants are 
“surrounded with excessive safeguards” and “treat[ed] . . . too leniently” find the 
practice of impeachment with prior convictions “insupportable.”  Beaver & Marques, 
supra note 4, at 587. 
 21 See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511 (1989) (“At common 
law a person who had been convicted of a felony was not competent to testify as a 
witness.”); Ladd, supra note 13, at 174 (explaining that common law precluded 
testimony from persons convicted of “infamous crimes under the laws of England, 
generally enumerated as treason, felony and the crimen falsi”). 
 22 Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467, 471 (1918). 
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previously disqualified witnesses to be impeached with the once 
disqualifying factors.  In the case of felons, this meant impeachment 
with their prior convictions.23  Thus, the practice of impeaching 
testifying witnesses with prior convictions was not, at least originally, 
intended to penalize defendants.  Instead, it was a byproduct of a 
progressive reform that removed rather than added to the obstacles 
facing convicts (including, of course, many criminal defendants) who 
sought to testify.24 
While this history is sufficient to explain the current practice of 
impeachment with felony convictions, it is not a particularly 
compelling justification for it.  The “conviction of [the present] 
time”25 leaves little room for admiring the relative liberality of modern 
practice as contrasted with seemingly archaic witness class 
disqualifications of English common law.  Instead, modern proponents 
of prior conviction impeachment must rely on its intrinsic merits — 
that knowledge of a witness’s prior conviction(s) provides insight to 
the jury in evaluating credibility.26 
 
 23 See Green, 490 U.S. at 511-12 (“As the law evolved, th[e] absolute bar gradually 
was replaced by a rule that allowed such witnesses to testify in both civil and criminal 
cases, but also to be impeached by evidence of a prior felony conviction or a crimen 
falsi misdemeanor conviction.”); Rogers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 325 F.2d 134, 137 
(6th Cir. 1963) (recognizing admissibility of prior conviction impeachment as “a 
carry-over from the common law”); Hornstein, supra note 1, at 22 (noting that 
“[t]ypically, when a jurisdiction abolished the disqualification of witnesses who had 
been convicted of a crime, it permitted the conviction to be used to impeach the 
testimony of the witness” and that “[n]o distinction was made between the garden 
variety witness and the criminal defendant testifying in her own behalf, despite what 
now seems the obviously greater prejudicial impact on the latter”). 
 24 Indeed, criminal defendants were among the classes of witnesses wholly 
disqualified from testifying under the common law tradition.  See Nix v. Whiteside, 
475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (“Until the latter part of the preceding century, criminal 
defendants in this country, as at common law, were considered to be disqualified from 
giving sworn testimony at their own trial by reason of their interest as a party to the 
case.”).  Of course, with respect to criminal defendants and other interested parties, 
the fact of their interest needed no specific authorization to be admissible as 
impeachment once the statutory disqualifications were repealed.  See FED. R. EVID. 601 
advisory committee’s note (commenting with respect to abolition of witness 
disqualifications that “[i]nterest in the outcome of litigation and mental capacity are, 
of course, highly relevant to credibility and require no special treatment to render 
them admissible along with other matters bearing upon the perception, memory, and 
narration of witnesses”). 
 25 Rosen, 245 U.S. at 471. 
 26 See People v. Castro, 696 P.2d 111, 118 (Cal. 1985) (recognizing that “while 
the historical basis for felony impeachment may well be the common law rule that a 
person convicted of any felony was totally incompetent as a witness . . . , the modern 
justification for the practice must be that prior felony convictions may, somehow, be 
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Indeed, just as the complete disqualification of felons as witnesses 
seemed sensible to those who crafted the common law, the logic of 
impeaching witnesses with prior convictions remains plausible today.  
A jury may draw some useful information from the fact that a witness 
has a criminal record, particularly, although not exclusively, when a 
prior crime involved a measure of dishonesty.27  As famously 
explained by Justice Holmes, evidence that a witness has been 
convicted of a serious crime suggests a “general readiness to do evil.”28 
It is from that general disposition . . . that the jury is asked to 
infer a readiness to lie in the particular case, and thence that 
he has lied in fact.  The evidence has [a] tendency to prove 
that . . . he has perjured himself, and it reaches that 
conclusion . . . through the general proposition that he is of 
bad character and unworthy of credit.29 
The same argument has been stated more colloquially, as follows: 
[C]onvicted felons are not generally permitted to stand pristine 
before a jury with the same credibility as that of a Mother 
Superior.  Fairness is not a one-way street and in the search for 
the truth it is a legitimate concern that one who testifies 
should not be allowed to appear as credible when his criminal 
record of major crimes suggests that he is not.30 
The justification for impeachment that is embodied in the preceding 
quotations becomes less forceful, however, when the witness is the 
accused in a criminal case.  Unlike any other witness, “[a] testifying 
defendant’s credibility is impeached by his interest in the trial’s 
outcome even before he utters a word.”31  Not only is every defendant 
 
relevant to the witness’ veracity”). 
 27 FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note to 1972 Proposed Rules (“There is 
little dissent from the general proposition that at least some crimes are relevant to 
credibility.”). 
 28 Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884); see also Green, 490 U.S. at 
508 n.4; Ladd, supra note 13, at 176. 
 29 Gertz, 137 Mass. at 78; see also Green, 490 U.S. at 508 n.4. 
 30 United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also 1 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 11, § 42, at 198 (“Most prosecutors argue 
forcefully that it is misleading to permit the accused to appear as a witness of 
blameless life, and this argument has prevailed widely.”). 
 31 James L. Kainen, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules:  Policies, 
Principles, and Politics, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1301, 1313 (1992); see also United States v. 
Gaines, 457 F.3d 238, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) (saying “[n]othing could be more obvious, 
and less in need of mention to a jury, than the defendant’s profound interest in the 
verdict”); Hornstein, supra note 1, at 62-63 (explaining “whatever probative value 
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(felon or not) subject to this form of impeachment, but the 
impeachment is quite powerful.  Jurors, who generally have little 
sympathy for a person charged with a crime, are well aware that even 
otherwise honest defendants have a strong incentive to shade their 
trial testimony in favor of acquittal.32 
The inherently cumulative nature of impeaching criminal 
defendants with prior convictions is demonstrated by the common law 
roots of the modern statutory framework.  At common law, a criminal 
defendant with a prior felony conviction was disqualified from 
testifying not only as a felon, but also as an interested party — a 
separate and independent common law ground for disqualification.33  
It stands to reason, then, that because only one ground for 
disqualification was considered sufficient to bar a witness from 
testifying at common law, only one ground for impeachment (felon or 
interested party) should now be necessary to substantially discredit a 
defendant’s testimony. 
The case for admitting prior convictions as impeachment of criminal 
defendants is further complicated by the fact that jurors will be 
tempted to consider a defendant’s past criminal acts not just for 
impeachment, but also as evidence of substantive guilt.34  This is, after 
 
prior conviction evidence may have on the believability of a defendant’s testimony, it 
is likely to pale in the face of the defendant’s obvious interest in the outcome of the 
case, an interest that will cause the jury to be cautious in its assessment of the 
defendant’s testimony”); cf. Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 
1966) (emphasizing that “[o]ne need not look for prior convictions to find motivation 
to falsify, for certainly that motive inheres in any case, whether or not the defendant 
has a prior record”); Gold, supra note 1, at 2326 (arguing that prior convictions 
generally have little probative value because, on question of defendant credibility, they 
tell jurors “nothing they do not already know”). 
 32 Brown, 370 F.2d at 244 (“We can expect jurors to be naturally wary of the 
defendant’s testimony, even though they may be unaware of his past conduct.”); 
Michael E. Antonio & Nicole E. Arone, Damned if They Do, Damned if They Don’t:  
Jurors’ Reaction to Defendant Testimony or Silence During a Capital Trial, 89 JUDICATURE 
60, 66 (Sept.-Oct. 2005) (reporting results of juror interviews showing that jurors 
generally view defendant testimony as untrustworthy); Beaver & Marques, supra note 
4, at 614 (recognizing “natural distrust that members of a jury undoubtedly have for 
one who is charged with a criminal offense”); Nichol, supra note 4, at 408 (“Greater 
incentive to deceive can hardly be imagined [than a defendant’s interest in acquittal] 
and this motive and propensity are well understood and recognized by each member 
of the jury.”). 
 33 See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986). 
 34 See Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 482 n.11 (1972) (“The sharpest and most 
prejudicial impact of the practice of impeachment by conviction . . . is upon one 
particular type of witness, namely, the accused in a criminal case who elects to take 
the stand”). 
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all, the reason that when a defendant does not testify, the prosecution 
is generally barred from introducing a “defendant’s prior trouble with 
the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even 
though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by 
propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime.”35  As the Supreme 
Court has explained, this prohibition exists not because the evidence 
is irrelevant; “on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the 
jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad 
general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a 
particular charge.”36 
To resolve the tension between the general prohibition of evidence 
of a defendant’s criminal past and the routine admission of such 
evidence as impeachment of the accused, the courts rely on a so-called 
“limiting” instruction.  Trial courts instruct juries to disregard any 
inference regarding the defendant’s criminal propensities and to 
instead limit their consideration of the defendant’s prior record to the 
narrow issue of credibility.37  The courts assume juries will do so.38 
Unfortunately, empirical studies and common sense suggest that a 
limiting instruction offers little protection against the prejudice 
inherent in prior conviction impeachment.39  This sentiment is 
 
 35 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948); see FED. R. EVID. 404(b) 
(“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of 
a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.”). 
 36 Michelson, 335 U.S. at 476; Ladd, supra note 13, at 186 (arguing that 
introduction of past offenses “helps the jury to be satisfied with much less proof than 
they otherwise would demand for conviction” and “makes them less critical in their 
effort to be sure that they have rightly convicted, finding solace from the possibility of 
error in the fact that after all the defendant is a bad man”). 
 37 A typical instruction reads:  “Th[e] [defendant’s] earlier conviction was brought 
to your attention only as one way of helping you decide how believable his testimony 
was.  You cannot use it for any other purpose.  It is not evidence that he is guilty of 
the crime that he is on trial for now.”  O’MALLEY, GRENIG & LEE, 1A FEDERAL JURY 
PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 15.08, at 427 (5th ed. 2007) (listing this instruction from 
Sixth Circuit and providing other examples by Circuit). 
 38 See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 884 (10th Cir. 1998) (“A 
central assumption of our jurisprudence is that juries follow the instructions they 
receive.”); cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 207 (1987) (noting reliance on 
related instructions in various contexts, including that “evidence of the defendant’s 
prior criminal convictions could be introduced for the purpose of sentence 
enhancement, so long as the jury was instructed it could not be used for purposes of 
determining guilt”). 
 39 See Beaver & Marques, supra note 4, at 602, 607 (arguing that despite limiting 
instruction, “[f]ew academicians believe . . . that jurors consider past crimes solely for 
impeachment purposes and not as proof of the defendant’s likelihood of having 
committed the charged offense” and reporting empirical data that suggest that juries 
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reflected in the sheer number of defendants who simply refrain from 
testifying rather than rely on the instruction.40  The limited 
effectiveness of a jury instruction in this context is due, in part, to the 
similarity of the relevant logical paths, or inferential chains, by which 
a defendant’s prior conviction is translated into either permissible 
impeachment or prohibited propensity evidence.  As explained by 
Justice Holmes, the permitted inferential chain is as follows:  (i) a 
felon has exhibited a character flaw that demonstrates a “general 
readiness to do evil;”41 (ii) a failure to testify truthfully is a species of 
 
do not, in fact, follow instruction); Dodson, supra note 11, at 31, 32 (reporting results 
of juror studies revealing that “jurors do use prior conviction evidence to infer 
criminal propensity and frequently ignore or fail to understand limiting instructions”); 
Nichol, supra note 4, at 403 (“Practicing attorneys almost universally concede that the 
limiting instruction fails to achieve its goal.”); see also Krulewitch v. United States, 
336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The naive assumption that 
prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing 
lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.”) (citations omitted); United States v. 
Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“Limiting instructions of this type 
require the jury to perform ‘a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their 
powers, but anybody’s else.’”) (quoting Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d 
Cir. 1932)); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (recognizing 
that when prior conviction evidence is admitted “it is admittedly difficult to restrict its 
impact, by cautionary instructions, to the issue of credibility”). 
 40 The empirical evidence suggests that up to half of all criminal defendants 
decline to testify in their defense.  See Blume, supra note 5, at 16 & n.49 (noting that 
“available evidence indicates that approximately one half of all criminal defendants 
testify at their trials” and citing supporting studies); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind 
Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 329-30 
(1991) (describing study of trials in Philadelphia in 1980s revealing that 49% of felony 
defendants and 57% of misdemeanor defendants chose not to testify); Gordon Van 
Kessel, Quieting the Guilty and Acquitting the Innocent:  A Close Look at a New Twist on 
the Right to Silence, 35 IND. L. REV. 925, 950-51 (2002) (summarizing studies dating 
back to 1920s and concluding that “with increasing frequency defendants are not 
taking the stand at trial as they once did” and “the extent of refusals to testify varies 
from one-third to well over one-half [of defendants] in some jurisdictions”).  While it 
is impossible to discern from these numbers exactly why any particular defendant 
chooses not to testify, “[t]he primary factor . . . in the decision not to take the stand is 
undoubtedly fear of the use of prior crimes to impeach.”  Nichol, supra note 4, at 400; 
see also Blume, supra note 5, at 17-19 (analyzing data regarding defendants cleared by 
post-conviction DNA testing and determining that 39% of apparently innocent 
defendants did not testify and 91% of those who did not testify had prior convictions); 
Dripps, supra note 3, at 1632 (postulating “[t]he principal reason why defendants 
refuse to take the stand is that they fear impeachment with prior convictions — a fear 
with strong support from the empirical evidence”); Van Kessel, supra note 3, at 482 
(citing empirical evidence that “a defendant [i]s almost three times more likely to 
refuse to testify if he ha[s] a criminal record than if not”).   
 41 Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R. Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884). 
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“evil;”42 (iii) a person with a general readiness to do evil is more likely 
to testify falsely than an average witness.43 
Whatever the merits of the permitted inferential chain,44 it is readily 
apparent that the links in that chain are almost identical to those in the 
prohibited inferential chain.45  A person beset by a “general readiness to 
do evil” is not only more likely to commit the evil of perjury, but also 
more likely to have committed the evil of the charged offense — 
particularly to the extent the past crime diverges from the crime of 
perjury and converges on the charged offense.46  For example, a 
 
 42 Cf. FED. R. EVID. 603 (requiring “every witness” to “declare that the witness will 
testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken 
the witness’ conscience and impress the witness’ mind with the duty to do so”). 
 43 See United States v. Headbird, 461 F.3d 1074, 1078 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that prior convictions are “highly probative of . . . credibility ‘because of the common 
sense proposition that one who has transgressed society’s norms by committing a 
felony is less likely than most to be deterred from lying under oath’”); Lipscomb, 702 
F.2d at 1061 (quoting Senate Judiciary Committee as explaining that “prior 
conviction[s] for . . . serious crimes are not totally irrelevant as to whether the witness 
is telling the truth, since they do reflect his attitude toward the rules of the game”); 
Gertz, 137 Mass. at 78; see also FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note, reprinted 
in 46 F.R.D. 161, 297 (1969) (“A demonstrated instance of willingness to engage in 
conduct in disregard of accepted patterns is translatable into willingness to give false 
testimony.”). 
 44 See Ladd, supra note 13, at 178 (questioning on “logical grounds” contention 
that “convictions-at-large of crimes-at-large satisfy the needs of relevancy to the task 
which they are assigned to perform”).  Ladd provides an oft-cited example of a man 
convicted of murder after dueling with another who called him a liar:  “‘The man 
prefers death to the imputation of a lie — and the inference of the law is, that he 
cannot open his mouth but lies will issue from it.’”  Id. at 178-79. 
 45 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, 28 FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE EVIDENCE § 6134, at 243-44 (2007) (emphasizing that “before the jury can 
draw the permitted inference concerning lack of truthfulness, it must first conclude 
that the accused’s character is that of a law breaker” which “is the same inference that 
leads juries to improperly conclude that an accused is a bad person who probably 
committed the offense charged or who deserves to be punished in any case”); cf. 
United States v. Harding, 525 F.2d 84, 89 (7th Cir. 1975) (“The fact that the 
defendant has sinned in the past implies that he is more likely to give false testimony 
than other witnesses; it also implies that he is more likely to have committed the 
offense for which he is being tried than if he had previously led a blameless life.  The 
law approves of the former inference but not the latter.”). 
 46 See United States v. Barnes, 622 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 1980) (recognizing that 
impeaching conviction is relevant as “evidence of the defendant’s criminal nature from 
which the jury could infer a propensity to falsify testimony” and consequently “there 
is a danger the jury will consider that same criminal nature as evidence that the 
defendant acted illegally on the occasion in question”); Hornstein, supra note 1, at 13 
(noting that inference “from character to conduct” required to support relevance of 
prior conviction as impeachment “is precisely the inference the law of evidence 
forbids” with respect to defendant’s underlying guilt). 
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defendant’s conviction for vehicular manslaughter introduced in a drunk 
driving prosecution says little about the defendant’s propensity to lie, but 
speaks volumes about his propensity to drive drunk.47  An instruction to 
ignore the more obvious inference while relying on the more obscure one 
requires “mental gymnastics” with an astounding degree of difficulty.48  
The typical juror would have to be forgiven if she felt the legal system is 
essentially winking at her as the instruction is read. 
Finally, the dilemma described above tells only part of the story 
because it assumes that the jury hears the defendant’s testimony and 
resulting impeachment.  In fact, defendants recognize the devastating 
impact of prior conviction impeachment, and have a trump card to 
play.  By declining to testify at all, a defendant can, and commonly 
will, eliminate the relevance and admissibility of any proffered 
impeachment.  The cost, however, is high.  To play this card, 
defendants must give up their constitutional right to testify, forfeiting 
their opportunity to be heard, and depriving jurors of potentially 
useful information on the ultimate question of the defendant’s guilt.49 
II. CONGRESS SPEAKS ON IMPEACHMENT:  FEDERAL RULE OF 
EVIDENCE 609 
The policy considerations underlying prior conviction impeachment 
described in the preceding section received a full airing in Congress in 
the early 1970s when legislators “hotly” debated the legal standard 
that would govern the admissibility of the accused’s prior convictions 
in the federal courts.50  As discussed below, this debate resulted in a 
 
 47 Nichol, supra note 4, at 398 (criticizing current state of federal law where juries 
are “able to consider past offenses for heroin distribution for purposes of determining 
whether the defendant is a liar, but not whether he is a heroin distributor”). 
 48 Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1062; United States v. Franicevich, 471 F.2d 427, 
430 (5th Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J., dissenting). 
 49 See Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules 
that Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 854-59, 881 (2008) 
(arguing that criminal justice system suffers not only when juries are deprived of 
defendants’ truthful direct examination testimony, but also when they are deprived of 
false defendant testimony that is tested, and exposed, by cross-examination and 
rebuttal evidence); Hornstein, supra note 1, at 1-2, 20 (noting that “[t]ypically, the 
defendant may keep the jury from learning of prior convictions only by waiving the 
right to testify” and, consequently, “important evidence will be sacrificed by the 
refusal of the witness to submit to such impeachment”). 
 50 United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (describing 
“[t]he labyrinthine history of Rule 609” and stating that “Rule 609 was one of the 
most hotly contested provisions in the Federal Rules of Evidence” and 
“unquestionably the product of careful deliberation and compromise”); Gold, supra 
note 1, at 2297, 2310 n.74 (highlighting “extraordinary amount of congressional 
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legislative compromise that was significantly more favorable to 
criminal defendants than the legal standard previously recognized in 
federal law and, as will be discussed in Part IV, considerably more 
favorable than the judicially crafted approach to prior conviction 
impeachment that prevails in the federal courts today. 
A. The Compromise Embodied in Rule 609 
After the statutory abolition of the common law bar to the testimony 
of felons (and interested parties), courts generally permitted, without 
reservation, felony conviction impeachment of all witnesses, including 
criminal defendants.51  The first notable sign of dissent from this 
practice came in the 1965 case of Luck v. United States.52   
In Luck, the District of Columbia Circuit interpreted a statutory 
provision governing proceedings within the District to allow trial 
courts to exclude an accused’s prior convictions due to their potential 
 
interest” in rule governing impeachment of testifying defendants); Nichol, supra note 
4, at 392 (describing Rule 609 as “one of the most vigorously debated sections of the 
federal evidence code”). 
 51 See Advisory Committee Comments to Proposed Rule 609, 51 F.R.D. 315, 393 
(1971) (recognizing that prior to 1965, “slight latitude was recognized for balancing 
probative value against prejudice” of prior convictions in federal system “though some 
authority allowed or required the trial judge to exclude convictions remote in point of 
time”); Advisory Committee’s Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the 
United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 299 (1969) (proposing 
that all felony convictions be admissible as impeachment and explaining that 
proposed “rule adheres to the traditional practice of allowing the witness-accused to 
be impeached by evidence of conviction of crime, like other witnesses”); Ladd, supra 
note 13, at 187 (recognizing in 1940 that “the right of the state to prove convictions of 
a crime is almost universally admitted as a test of veracity”); see, e.g., United States v. 
Villegas, 487 F.2d 882, 883 (9th Cir. 1973) (“To date, this court has shown no 
disposition to abandon its long-standing rule that proof of any prior felony conviction 
may be given by the adversary to impeach any witness, including a defendant who 
elects to testify in a criminal trial.”); Schwab v. United States, 327 F.2d 11, 16 (8th 
Cir. 1964) (noting that when defendant “took the stand he voluntarily put his 
character in issue and, for impeachment purposes, could then be asked questions 
about prior convictions”); United States v. Pennix, 313 F.2d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1963) 
(“‘[I]t is settled that when a defendant tenders himself as a witness, his credibility, like 
that of any other witness, may be questioned by asking him as to previous 
convictions.’”); United States v. Ziemer, 291 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1961) 
(recognizing introduction of defendant’s past conviction as “a well-established method 
of impeachment”); Taylor v. United States, 279 F.2d 10, 12 (5th Cir. 1960) (noting 
that when defendant “took the stand he voluntarily put his character in issue and, for 
impeachment purposes, could then be asked questions about prior convictions”); 
United States v. Howell, 240 F.2d 149, 158 (3d Cir. 1956) (same). 
 52 Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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“prejudicial effect.”53  Luck’s deviation from the accepted practice of 
automatic admission of prior conviction impeachment was short lived, 
however.  Soon after the decision, Congress amended the District of 
Columbia statute, nullifying Luck’s holding.54 
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence took 
notice of Congress’s action and shortly thereafter drafted a proposed 
evidentiary rule to govern prior conviction impeachment in the federal 
courts.55  The Supreme Court forwarded the rule to Congress in 1972 
as proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609.56  Proposed Rule 609 
directed trial courts to admit convictions for all crimes “punishable by 
death or imprisonment in excess of one year” (i.e., felonies) as well as 
all crimes (felony or misdemeanor) involving “dishonesty or false 
statement regardless of the punishment” for “the purpose of attacking 
the credibility of a witness.”57  In earlier drafts of the Rule, the 
Advisory Committee recognized the “troublesome aspect of 
impeachment by evidence of conviction” when “the witness is himself 
the accused in a criminal case.”58  In the commentary accompanying 
its final proposal, however, the Committee explained that, “[w]hatever 
may be the merits” of limits on the impeachment of criminal 
 
 53 Id. at 768; Lewis F. Powell, Jr., In Memoriam:  Judge Carl McGowan, 56 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 681, 681 (1988) (noting that Judge McGowan’s 1965 opinion in Luck 
was first substantial challenge to “the fairness of impeachment of criminal defendants 
who testified by automatically introducing evidence of their prior crimes” that 
“generally was the rule throughout the nation”). 
 54 See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 514 (1989) (stating that 
“in 1970 Congress amended the District of Columbia Code to provide that both prior 
felony and crimen falsi impeaching evidence ‘shall be admitted’” as opposed to “may” 
be admitted as statute read when Luck was decided).  Interestingly, while Congress 
later limited the admissibility of prior convictions in the federal courts, it did not 
amend the statute governing criminal proceedings in the courts of the District of 
Columbia, which continues to mandate admission of prior convictions without 
balancing.  See D.C. CODE § 14-305(b)(1) (2008); Leslie Lawlor Hayes, Comment, 
Prior Conviction Impeachment in the District of Columbia:  What Happened When the 
Courts Ran Out of Luck?, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 1157, 1163-64 (1986). 
 55 Green, 490 U.S. at 517 (chronicling legislative history of Rule 609). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 
269 (1973).  Exceptions were made for convictions where 10 years had passed since the 
later of the witness’s release from prison or expiration of the period of probation or 
parole on “his most recent conviction,” certain juvenile convictions, and convictions for 
which the witness received a pardon or equivalent post-conviction relief.  Id. at 269-70. 
 58 Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and 
Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315, 393 (1971).  An earlier draft of proposed Rule 609 
included as its “most significant feature” a balancing test precluding such 
impeachment if “the judge determines that its probative value is outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice.”  Id. 
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defendants, the Rule was drafted in accordance with the perceived 
congressional policy preference (demonstrated by the legislative 
rejection of Luck) of broadly encouraging prior conviction 
impeachment.59 
As the Advisory Committee reporter later noted, “[a]pparently 
Congress had a change of heart on the matter.”60  Upon receipt of the 
Advisory Committee’s draft Rule 609, Congress prohibited the Rule 
from taking effect and enacted an alternative Rule 609.61  As enacted, 
Rule 609 not only accepted the limitations placed on prior conviction 
impeachment in Luck (a decision the legislators had only recently 
rejected), but limited such impeachment to an even greater degree 
than even the Luck court contemplated. 
Congress was not of one mind on the question, however.  The Rule 
as finally enacted, and currently in force, embodies a compromise 
between “two diametrically opposed positions”62:  the position of the 
Senate (circa 1974) that all felony convictions should be admissible to 
impeach testifying defendants; and that of the House of 
Representatives that impeachment should be limited to the narrow 
subset of so-called crimen falsi convictions, crimes involving “proof or 
admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement.”63 
The Conference Committee that drafted the final text of the Rule 
bridged the broad gap between the two chambers by retaining the 
general principle that all felonies could potentially be admissible as 
impeachment.  It mandated, however, that any felony outside the 
 
 59 Advisory Committee Notes to Proposed Rule 609, 56 F.R.D. 183, 270 (1973). 
 60 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
609App.01[4], at 12.1 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2008) (quoting Advisory 
Committee reporter, Professor Daniel Capra). 
 61 FED. R. EVID. 609; see Green, 490 U.S. at 517. 
 62 See Roderick Surratt, Prior-Conviction Impeachment Under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence:  A Suggested Approach to Applying the ‘Balancing’ Provision of Rule 609(a), 31 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 907, 920 (1980) (discussing diametrically opposed positions); see 
also Gold, supra note 1, at 2296 (“Ultimately, no one side in this legislative battle 
prevailed entirely; the Rule strikes a compromise between sharply conflicting 
policies.”); Irving Younger, Three Essays on Character and Credibility Under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 7, 11 (1976) (describing Rule 609(a) as “political 
compromise” between “those who argued for unlimited use of convictions to 
impeach” and “those who urged strict limits” on such impeachment); cf. Green, 490 
U.S. at 520 (chronicling legislative history of Rule 609); United States v. Kiendra, 663 
F.2d 349, 355 (1st Cir. 1981) (“Rule 609(a) received extensive scrutiny in both 
chambers of Congress and underwent many modifications before the final 
compromise was struck in Conference Committee.”). 
 63 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1); Green, 490 U.S. at 509; Surratt, supra note 62, at 917-20. 
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“narrow spectrum” of crimen falsi convictions64 would be admissible 
only if “the [trial] court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant.”65 
B. Reading Between the Lines:  The Anti-Impeachment Tenor of 
Rule 609 
While on its face appearing to occupy something of a middle ground 
between the anti-impeachment House and pro-impeachment Senate 
positions, the balancing test incorporated into the final version of Rule 
609 distinctly favors criminal defendants (and thus the House 
position).  As a preliminary matter, the Rule represents a sweeping 
departure from prior federal law, unequivocally rejecting the 
automatic admissibility of felony convictions that had previously been 
 
 64 This “narrow spectrum of crimes” (felony or misdemeanor) subject to 
automatic admissibility under Rule 609(a)(2) includes only crimes such as “‘perjury 
or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false 
pretenses.’”  Surratt, supra note 62, at 922; see also FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory 
committee’s note to 1990 and 2006 amendments.  Significantly, this category does not 
include property crimes such as theft, or crimes that do not inherently involve 
dishonesty (e.g., murder), even if the specific facts of the crime evidenced dishonest 
acts on the part of the defendant.  See United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269, 1273 
(9th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that “crimes of violence, theft crimes, and crimes of 
stealth do not involve ‘dishonesty or false statement’ within the meaning of rule 
609(a)(2)”); 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 60, §§ 609.04[2][b] to -[3][c], at 24.1. 
 65 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1); Surratt, supra note 62, at 922.  As originally enacted, 
Rule 609(a) stated:   
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has 
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted . . . but only if the crime (1) was 
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law 
under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative 
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
See Surratt, supra note 62, at 907 n.1, 919 n.54.  This rhetorical formulation was later 
altered so that the “but only” phrasing was removed; in notes to the amendment, the 
Advisory Committee emphasized, however, that “[t]he amendment does not disturb 
the special balancing test for the criminal defendant who chooses to testify.”  FED. R. 
EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note to 1990 Amendments.  As amended, the Rule also 
replaced the term “the defendant” with “the accused,” the pronoun “he” with the 
gender neutral phrase “the witness,” and clarified the language of subsection (a)(2) so 
as “to give effect to the [original] legislative intent” as expressed in the Conference 
Report that the subsection be construed narrowly.  See FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory 
committee’s note to 1990 and 2006 Amendments; see also Green, 490 U.S. at 509. 
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the federal norm.66  Instead, Congress, like the Luck court before it, 
granted trial courts broad authority to exclude the vast majority of 
prior convictions offered as impeachment.67  Congress’s action 
constituted a sharp deviation from “the prevailing doctrine in the 
federal courts” that was intended to mitigate the “unfair prejudice” 
caused by prior conviction impeachment and the “deterrent effect” of 
the practice “upon an accused who might wish to testify.”68   
Of even greater significance, Congress, while choosing to embrace 
the general approach suggested by Luck, was not satisfied with Luck’s 
fairly permissive standard for admitting prior convictions.  Instead, the 
legislators moved beyond Luck in fashioning a significantly more 
restrictive standard for the bulk of potentially admissible 
convictions.69 
Luck held that a trial court could exclude a prior conviction where 
“the prejudicial effect of impeachment far outweighs the probative 
relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility”70 — a 
formulation that mirrors the catch-all evidentiary provision of Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403.71  Congress, while later incorporating a Rule 403 
 
 66 See sources cited supra note 51. 
 67 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (establishing statutory authority for trial courts’ use of 
discretionary balancing test, similar to that used in Luck). 
 68 H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 11 (1973); see, e.g., 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 
60, § 609App.01[3], at 10 (recognizing that House Judiciary Committee’s changes to 
rule were motivated by concern that existing text did not “adequately protect[] an 
accused who wished to testify”). 
 69 Prior to Rule 609’s enactment, even commentators who advocated complete 
abolition of prior conviction impeachment accepted that, as more significant 
restrictions on the practice were not a “realistic possibility,” “[t]he Luck approach . . . 
seems to be the most effective means of reform.”  Robert G. Spector, Impeachment 
Through Past Convictions:  A Time for Reform, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 23 (1968); see also 
Ladd, supra note 13, at 178 (advocating abolition of prior crime impeachment of 
criminal defendants, but noting that “this method of impeachment is so generally 
recognized that it will probably be difficult to change in the future”). 
 70 Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (emphasis added).  
Similarly, in following Luck (prior to its abrogation by Congress), the Advisory 
Committee promulgated an early draft of proposed Rule 609 that included, as its 
“most significant feature,” a “particularized application of [Federal Rule of Evidence] 
403(a).”  Advisory Committee Comments to Proposed Rule 609, 51 F.R.D. 315, 393 
(1971).  This early draft (which was never forwarded to Congress) permitted 
exclusion of a defendant’s prior convictions if “the judge determines that the probative 
value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.”  Id. at 391 (emphasis added); see Green, 490 U.S. at 515-16 (1989). 
 71 FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting exclusion of relevant evidence where danger of 
unfair prejudice “substantially outweigh[s]” probative value).  Luck and Rule 403, 
thus, would support exclusion of relatively few convictions.  In fact, Luck itself 
concerned an unusually prejudicial prior offense that was identical to the charged 
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balancing test into Rule 609 with respect to the admission of the felony 
convictions of all other witnesses,72 implicitly rejected that test as too 
permissive to govern the convictions of the accused.  Thus, while Rule 
403 calls for the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence if the danger 
of unfair prejudice “substantially outweigh[s]” probative value,73 “the 
special balancing test for the criminal defendant who chooses to 
testify”74 in Rule 609 mandates the exclusion of a felony conviction if its 
prejudicial effect merely “outweighs” probative value.75 
Congress also incorporated a second significant deviation from a 
Rule 403-type formulation into the Rule 609 balancing test.  Under 
Rule 403 (as well as under the rule announced in Luck), the burden of 
persuasion of establishing that relevant evidence should be excluded 
falls on the opponent of the evidence.76  Under Rule 609(a)(1), 
however, Congress placed the burden of demonstrating the 
admissibility of a defendant’s convictions on the prosecution.77  As 
 
offense and minimally probative (because it was a juvenile adjudication), but the 
District of Columbia Circuit nevertheless ruled that it could not find “reversible error 
in permitting this appellant to be asked about his prior conviction.”  Luck, 348 F.2d at 
769; see FED. R. EVID. 609(d) (barring admission of juvenile adjudications as 
impeachment of accused).  The Luck court stated only that, because the case would be 
remanded on another issue, the trial judge should “feel free to approach the 
problem . . . as one to be decided according to his best judgment” in the event of a 
new trial.  Luck, 348 F.2d at 769. 
 72 See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (as amended 1990). 
 73 FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added). 
 74 FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note to 1990 Amendments. 
 75 In fact, the Rule also mandates exclusion even if probative value and prejudicial 
effect are equally balanced.  See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) (counseling exclusion of 
convictions unless “probative value . . . outweighs . . . prejudicial effect”); United 
States v. De La Cruz, 902 F.2d 121, 123 (1st Cir. 1990) (recognizing that “internalized 
balancing test” in Rule 609(a)(1) “is somewhat stricter” than balancing test in Rule 
403); United States v. Ross, 44 M.J. 534, 535-36 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1996) 
(conveying same recognition of stricter balancing test in Rule 609). 
 76 United States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148, 164 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that “[t]he 
burden under Rule 403 is on the party opposing admission”); Gordon v. United States, 
383 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (determining prior to Rule 609 that “[t]he burden 
of persuasion [under Luck] . . . is on the accused”); Surratt, supra note 62, at 923 
(explaining “[u]nder the Luck doctrine, the burden of persuasion was on the 
defendant”). 
 77 See FED. R. EVID. 609 advisory committee’s note to 1990 Amendments 
(“Although the rule does not forbid all use of convictions to impeach a defendant, it 
requires that the government show that the probative value of convictions as 
impeachment evidence outweighs their prejudicial effect.”); United States v. 
Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“[T]he language of Rule 609(a)(1), as 
enacted, manifests an intent to shift the burden of persuasion with respect to 
admission of prior conviction evidence for impeachment.”); cf. United States v. 
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other commentators have noted, this shifting of the burden of 
persuasion “indicates an intent on the part of [Congress] that ‘close 
cases’ should be decided in favor of the defendant.”78 
These two critical departures from the Rule 403/Luck formula in 
shaping the balance to be utilized by the trial court become 
particularly significant when considered in concert with the 
terminology chosen by Congress with regard to what was to be 
weighed:  “probative value” and “prejudicial effect.”79  As discussed in 
Part I, for the vast run of criminal convictions, the probative value of a 
conviction as impeachment is minimal.80  This is because, as the 
Supreme Court has explained in a related context, the probative value 
of proffered evidence (as distinct from its relevance) requires a 
comparison of “evidentiary alternatives” and must be “discount[ed]” 
when there exists an alternative means of proof with “substantially the 
same or greater probative value but a lower danger of unfair 
prejudice.”81  Thus, while prior convictions may generally be relevant 
to impeach trial witnesses, this evidence will usually have minimal 
probative value when the witness is the accused.82  Even if precluded 
from introducing prior convictions, prosecutors always have a 
significantly more compelling and less prejudicial alternative means of 
 
Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1488 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Mahone, 537 
F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 1976) (“Rule 609 places the burden of proof on the 
government.”). 
 78 Surratt, supra note 62, at 924 n.64.  Congress’s appreciation of the significance 
of shifting the burden to the prosecution is evidenced by comments of the legislators 
during debate.  Gold, supra note 1, at 2324; Surratt, supra note 62, at 924 n.64.  . 
 79 FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 80 A prior conviction may be probative on other points (for example as evidence of 
a criminal propensity).  Nevertheless, “probative value” under Rule 609 speaks solely 
to the conviction’s relevance as impeachment — its use “[f]or the purpose of attacking 
the character for truthfulness of a witness.”  FED. R. EVID. 609(a); FED. R. EVID. 609 
advisory committee’s note to 1990 Amendments (explaining that “it was unnecessary 
to add to the rule language stating that, when a prior conviction is offered under Rule 
609, the trial court is to consider the probative value of the prior conviction for 
impeachment, not for other purposes” because proposition was inescapable from “the 
title of the rule, its first sentence, and its placement among the impeachment rules”) 
(emphasis added); see also United States v. Valencia, 61 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(emphasizing that “[t]he probative character of evidence under Rule 609 has to do 
with credibility of a witness”); United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (explaining that “the probative value of . . . prior conviction evidence” is 
“the tendency of the . . . evidence to persuade the jury that defendant [i]s not a 
credible person”). 
 81 Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 184 (1997) (contrasting “probative 
value” with “relevance” as used in Federal Rules of Evidence). 
 82 See sources cited supra note 31. 
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discrediting the defendant’s testimony — the defendant’s abiding 
interest in the outcome of the case. 
Congress’s selection of the phrase “prejudicial effect to the accused” 
for the other side of the balance is also telling, particularly in concert 
with its omission of any qualifier such as “unfair” (as in Rule 403)83 
from the “prejudicial effect” the Rule seeks to avoid.84  As discussed in 
Part I, the introduction of a criminal defendant’s prior felony offenses 
will virtually always have a significant “prejudicial effect to the 
accused.”  This proposition is nothing less than a tenet of American 
evidentiary jurisprudence, which emphasizes, in other contexts, that 
an accused’s prior record will invariably “weigh too much with the 
jur[ors]” and “overpersuade” them on the question of guilt.85  As one 
court has explained, “[w]hen the defendant is impeached by a prior 
conviction, the question of prejudice, as Congress well knew, is not if, 
but how much.”86 
In sum, the legislators’ “concerns about the deterrent effect upon an 
accused who might wish to testify and the danger of unfair 
prejudice,”87 resulted in a Rule that seeks to strictly limit prior 
 
 83 FED. R. EVID. 403 (permitting exclusion of evidence where probative value is 
substantially outweighed by danger of “unfair prejudice”). 
 84 See id.; FED. R. EVID. 609; see also United States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148, 163 (1st Cir. 
2004) (observing that “while a court must weigh all potential ‘prejudicial effect’ to the 
defendant when deciding whether to admit a prior conviction of the accused, it must 
weigh only the kind of prejudice that can be deemed ‘unfair’ when deciding whether to 
admit the prior conviction of a government witness” under Rule 403); 4 WEINSTEIN & 
BERGER, supra note 60, § 609.05[3][a], at 609-36 (emphasizing “contrast” between Rule 
403 and Rule 609(a)(1)).  The significance of the absence of the “unfair” qualifier itself, 
while certainly consistent with a congressional intent to favor the defense side of the 
balance, should not be overstated.  Congress could not have meant by this omission that 
the courts should consider even the intended prejudicial effect (the harm done to the 
defendant’s credibility) as this intended prejudice will always be exactly equal to the 
probative value of the evidence and would, consequently, render the balancing exercise 
meaningless.  See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, § 6134, at 39 (Supp. 2008) (noting 
absence of qualifier “unfair” but acknowledging that “the phrase ‘prejudicial effect’ as 
employed in Rule 609(a)(1) must be referring to prejudice that is ‘unfair’ in the same 
sense intended by Rule 403”). 
 85 FED. R. EVID. 404; Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948); 
supra note 35. 
 86 United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see WRIGHT 
& GOLD, supra note 45, § 6134, at 243 (stating “conviction evidence offered against an 
accused will almost always cause prejudice”); supra Part I. 
 87 Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 518 (1989) (quoting from 
House Judiciary Committee Report); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 361 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (noting that in “forging a consensus,” Conference Committee that drafted 
rule was “aware of the substantial sentiment in both chambers for limiting 
impeachment by prior conviction, especially in the criminal defendant-as-witness 
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conviction impeachment of criminal defendants.  By virtue of the legal 
terminology chosen by Congress (“probative value” and “prejudicial 
effect”), the placement of these concepts on equal footing in the 
relevant balance, and the assignment of the burden of persuasion to 
the prosecution, Rule 609 sets up a contest that is really no contest at 
all, strongly favoring the defense in most cases.88  Consequently, much 
of the modern scholarly criticism of the perceived unfair prejudice of 
prior conviction impeachment of testifying defendants should be 
unnecessary.  The critics have already won the policy battle.  Rule 609 
responds to the charge that prior conviction impeachment of testifying 
defendants is generally minimally probative and greatly prejudicial by 
unequivocally requiring the exclusion of the impeachment in any case 
where this criticism proves true. 
III. IMPLEMENTING RULE 609’S BALANCING TEST:  THE FIVE-FACTOR 
FRAMEWORK 
While strongly favorable to criminal defendants, Rule 609’s general 
directive that the criminal record of the accused should be excluded 
unless its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect is not self-
executing.  Instead, the Rule relies on trial judges to strike the 
appropriate balance in particular cases by weighing the “probative 
value” and “prejudicial effect” of each proffered conviction. 
In an apparent attempt to foster uniformity in the district courts, the 
federal appellate courts crafted a multi-factor analytical framework to 
govern Rule 609 balancing.89  This section explores the origins of that 
framework and highlights its inherent flaws, which would eventually 
sabotage the courts’ implementation of Rule 609. 
A. United States v. Mahone Establishes the Five-Factor Framework 
The effort to fill the discretionary void created by Rule 609’s 
balancing test was spearheaded by the Seventh Circuit.  Shortly after 
 
context”). 
 88 See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, § 6134, at 243 (“Where conviction 
evidence is offered against an accused, a serious effort to balance in light of the burden 
assigned to the prosecution usually should lead to the conclusion that the evidence is 
inadmissible.”); Impeachment Under Rule 609(a):  Suggestions for Confining and Guiding 
Trial Court Discretion, 71 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 661 (1977) [hereinafter Impeachment] 
(recognizing in text of Rule “a bias against the restraining and destructive nature of 
impeachment evidence”). 
 89 See Impeachment, supra note 88, at 661 (contending shortly after enactment of 
Rule that federal courts “have been unable to ascertain what criteria to use in 
balancing probative value against unfair prejudice”). 
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Rule 609’s enactment, that court, in United States v. Mahone, proposed 
a five-factor analytical framework to govern district courts’ evaluation 
of probative value and prejudicial effect.90 
Apparently failing to recognize the future reach of its opinion, the 
totality of Mahone’s discussion of the relevant considerations for Rule 
609 balancing is as follows:   
Some of the factors which the judge should take into account 
in making [the Rule 609] determination were articulated by 
then Judge Burger in Gordon v. United States[:] 
(1) The impeachment value of the prior crime. 
(2) The point in time of the conviction and the witness’ 
subsequent history. 
(3) The similarity between the past crime and the 
charged crime. 
(4) The importance of the defendant’s testimony. 
(5) The centrality of the credibility issue.91 
Although explicitly enumerating criteria to be applied under Rule 609, 
Mahone looked to pre-Rule 609 case law and particularly the District of 
Columbia Circuit case of Gordon v. United States92 for the relevant 
considerations.93  Analysis of the Mahone factors, which would soon 
permeate the federal case law, thus requires a further step backward to 
the pre-Rule 609 case law from which the factors are derived. 
B. The District of Columbia Circuit’s Pre-Rule 609 Case Law 
Gordon v. United States, an opinion authored by then-Circuit Judge 
(later Chief Justice) Burger, represents the apogee of the landmark 
pre-Rule 609 jurisprudence of the District of Columbia Circuit.  Its 
analysis, however, built upon the District of Columbia Circuit’s earlier 
discussion of prior conviction impeachment contained in Luck v. 
United States.94 
In Luck, in addition to the groundbreaking suggestion that trial 
courts possess some discretion to exclude prior convictions,95 the 
 
 90 United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 1976). 
 91 Id. 
 92 383 F.2d 936, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
 93 Mahone, 537 F.2d at 929 (citing Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940).   
 94 348 F.2d 763, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 95 See supra Part II.A. 
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District of Columbia Circuit set out a concise list of potentially 
pertinent considerations for exercising that discretion: 
the nature of the prior crimes, the length of the criminal 
record, the age and circumstances of the defendant, and, above 
all, the extent to which it is more important to the search for 
truth in a particular case for the jury to hear the defendant’s 
story than to know of a prior conviction.96 
The Luck court emphasized this last consideration, stating that 
“[t]he goal of a criminal trial is the disposition of the charge in 
accordance with the truth” and “[t]he possibility of a rehearsal of the 
defendant’s criminal record in a given case, especially if it means that 
the jury will be left without one version of the truth, may or may not 
contribute to that objective.”97 
Gordon v. United States expanded Luck’s discussion by providing further 
“guidelines” in the form of an exposition intended to help courts weigh 
the propriety of prior conviction impeachment.98  The five considerations 
discussed in Gordon (considerations that would later become the five 
Mahone factors) echo those mentioned in Luck.  The first three 
considerations address the probative value of the prior conviction as 
impeachment and its potential prejudicial effect, specifically:  (i) the 
nature of the prior conviction, that is, whether the conviction “rest[s] on 
dishonest conduct”; (ii) its “nearness or remoteness” in time; and (iii) 
whether “the prior conviction is for the same or substantially the same 
conduct for which the accused is on trial.”99   
Gordon next discussed two other considerations that are less clearly 
tied to the probative-prejudice dichotomy.  With respect to what 
would become the fourth Mahone factor, “the importance of the 
defendant’s testimony,” Gordon states, citing Luck, that:  “One 
important consideration is what the effect will be if the defendant does 
not testify out of fear of being prejudiced because of impeachment by 
prior convictions.”100  The court explained, “[e]ven though a judge 
might find that the prior convictions are relevant to credibility and the 
risk of prejudice to the defendant does not warrant their exclusion, he 
may nevertheless conclude that it is more important that the jury have 
 
 96 Luck, 348 F.2d at 769. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (citing Luck, 348 
F.2d at 768). 
 99 Id. at 940. 
 100 Id. (citing Luck, 348 F.2d at 768). 
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the benefit of the defendant’s version of the case than to have the 
defendant remain silent out of fear of impeachment.”101 
The Gordon opinion next posited a final consideration that would 
later be distilled into the fifth Mahone factor, “the centrality of the 
credibility issue.”102  The court stated that where the trial “had 
narrowed to the credibility of two persons, the accused and his 
accuser,” the defendant’s record becomes particularly significant.103  In 
such circumstances, the Gordon court explained there was a 
“compelling” need to “explor[e] all avenues which would shed light 
on which of the two witnesses was to be believed.”104 
C. The Implications of Mahone’s Reliance on Gordon 
The first three factors Mahone draws from the Gordon opinion 
warrant little analysis as those factors simply reflect the probative-
prejudice dichotomy set forth in Rule 609.  The more striking facet of 
the Mahone framework is its unquestioned acceptance of the fourth 
and fifth considerations enumerated in Gordon, factors that are not 
explicitly anticipated by the text of Rule 609.105 
Under Rule 609, evidence of a felony conviction is admissible as 
impeachment if “the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused.”106  This formulation 
speaks, at least explicitly, solely to the initial aspect of the calculus 
 
 101 Id.  The Gordon court reiterated this consideration in a footnote, stating that the 
trial court must consider “whether the defendant’s testimony is so important that he 
should not be forced to elect between staying silent — risking prejudice due to the 
jury’s going without one version of the facts — and testifying — risking prejudice 
through exposure of his criminal past.”  Id. at 941 n.11; see also Luck, 348 F.2d at 769 
(requiring trial courts to consider “above all, the extent to which it is more important 
to the search for truth in a particular case for the jury to hear the defendant’s story 
than to know of a prior conviction”). 
 102 United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 1976). 
 103 Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940. 
 104 Id. at 941. 
 105 This is, of course, a more significant criticism of the Mahone decision, which was 
ostensibly interpreting Rule 609, than it is a criticism of the Gordon decision, which 
predated the Rule.  The District of Columbia Circuit has, both before and after Mahone, 
recognized that “the inquiry to be conducted by the trial court under Rule 609(a) differs 
significantly from that mandated by Luck and its progeny.”  United States v. Crawford, 
613 F.2d 1045, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 357 (D.C. 
Cir. 1976) (recognizing that “[d]espite substantial surface similarity,” inquiry 
established by Luck/Gordon line of cases predated the adoption of Rule 609 and 
remanding, with respect to one defendant, for further proceedings based on trial court’s 
reliance on pre-Rule 609 case law to determine admissibility of prior conviction). 
 106 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). 
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considered in Gordon (i.e., the first three Mahone factors) — probative 
value versus prejudice.  There is little in the text of the Rule to suggest 
that in addition to this balancing, a court should consider whether:  (i) 
permitting impeachment might deleteriously deprive the factfinder of 
the defendant’s testimony (Mahone’s fourth factor);107 or (ii) otherwise 
improper impeachment should be admitted because of the central role 
of “credibility” in the case (Mahone’s fifth factor).  Indeed, one 
commentator has argued that these last two factors do not address 
case-specific considerations at all, but rather “embody general 
concepts” that are “merely restatements of the conflicting interest that 
Congress balanced in adopting the rule.”108 
Were it not for the intervention of Mahone, then, the District of 
Columbia Circuit’s pre-Rule 609 exploration of the proper analytical 
framework for evaluating whether to permit prior conviction 
impeachment of a testifying defendant (and particularly Gordon’s 
fourth and fifth considerations) would likely have become a mere 
historical curiosity.  Gordon’s exposition on prior conviction 
impeachment would properly have been subsumed by the enactment 
of Rule 609 and Congress’s implicit decision to impose stricter limits 
on the admission of prior convictions than the Luck-Gordon line of 
cases suggested.  Instead, Mahone immortalized Gordon in two subtle 
ways.  First, it established (albeit without analysis or explanation) that 
this pre-Rule 609 case law regarding the admissibility of prior 
 
 107 In fact, at the outset of the Luck opinion, the D.C. Circuit set this factor out as a 
consideration distinct from the balancing of probative value against prejudice, stating:   
[(1)] There may well be cases where the trial judge might think that the 
cause of truth would be helped more by letting the jury hear the defendant’s 
story than by the defendant’s foregoing that opportunity because of the fear 
of prejudice founded upon a prior conviction.  [(2)] There may well be other 
cases where the trial judge believes the prejudicial effect of impeachment far 
outweighs the probative relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of 
credibility. 
Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (emphasis added). 
 108 Surratt, supra note 62, at 943; see also Jackson v. State, 668 A.2d 8, 16 (Md. 
1995) (“Factors four and five are restatements of the considerations that underlie the 
Rule.”).  Interestingly, the Advisory Committee Notes to the proposed Rule 609 
summarized Gordon without reference to either the fourth or fifth factor, stating:  
“Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger suggested in Gordon various factors to be considered 
in making the determination:  the nature of the crime, nearness or remoteness, the 
subsequent career of the person, and whether the crime was similar to the one 
charged.”  Advisory Committee Notes to Proposed Rule 609, 51 F.R.D. 315, 
393 (1971); see also Surratt, supra note 62, at 918 (chronicling legislative history of 
Rule 609 and noting concerns regarding “‘deterrent effect [of prior convictions] upon 
an accused who might wish to testify’”). 
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convictions survived the enactment of Rule 609.  Second, it distilled 
the case law, and particularly Gordon’s lengthy discussion of the 
pertinent considerations, into a citation-friendly, albeit facially 
ambiguous, framework (again without analysis). 
Despite its flaws, the Mahone decision was broadly influential.  The 
opinion represents ground zero in a subsequent outbreak of the 
deceptively simple five-factor framework throughout the federal courts 
and in numerous state courts.109  Perhaps largely due to the absence of 
any competing formulation, the Mahone framework (in various iterations) 
continues to function today as the primary means of evaluating the 
admissibility of prior conviction impeachment in virtually every federal 
jurisdiction and numerous state jurisdictions as well.110 
 
 109 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 106 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing 
Mahone for “five-part test to guide the district court in the exercise of its discretion in 
determining whether the probative value of the conviction outweighs its prejudicial 
effect”); United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1185 n.8 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc) 
(citing Mahone for five factors “to assist district judges confronted with a request for a 
ruling”); United States v. Sims, 588 F.2d 1145, 1149 (6th Cir. 1978) (discussing 
Mahone and listing five factors as restated in Mahone, but crediting Gordon); Theus v. 
State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (relying on Mahone factors in 
applying state impeachment rule); see also Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the 
Presumptions of Guilt and Innocence:  Rules 404(b), 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 
135, 197-98 (1989) (“The standards usually set forth in 609(a)(1) cases are laid down 
in United States v. Mahone.”); cf. cases cited infra note 110.  The courts also rely on the 
Mahone factors in interpreting the related balancing test set forth in Rule 609(b).  See 
4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 60, § 609.06[1], at 609-45 to -46.1. 
 110 Mahone’s five-factor framework, or a close variant, governs review of 
impeachment rulings in 10 of the 12 federal circuits that consider criminal appeals, 
excepting only the Fourth and Eighth Circuits.  For representative cases from each 
federal circuit (except those noted above), see the following:  First Circuit, United 
States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2005); Second Circuit, United States v. Hawley, 
554 F.2d 50, 53 n.5 (2d Cir. 1977);  Haynes v. Kanaitis, No. Civ.A.3:99CV2551, 2004 
WL 717115, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 3, 2004); Third Circuit, Gov’t of V.I. v. Bedford, 671 
F.2d 758, 761 n.4 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Davis, 235 F.R.D. 292, 296 (W.D. 
Pa. 2006); United States v. Butch, 48 F. Supp. 2d 453, 464 (D.N.J. 1999); Fifth Circuit, 
United States v. Acosta, 763 F.2d 671, 695 n.30 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Preston, 608 F.2d 626, 639 n.17 (5th Cir. 1979); Sixth Circuit, United States v. Moore, 
917 F.2d 215, 234 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sims, 588 F.2d 1145, 1149 (6th 
Cir. 1978); Seventh Circuit, United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th 
Cir. 2004); Ninth Circuit, United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 369 F.3d 1076, 1088 
(9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1488 (9th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1185 n.8 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc); Tenth Circuit, 
United States v. Sides, 944 F.2d 1554, 1560 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cueto, 
506 F. Supp. 9, 13 (W.D. Okla. 1979); United States v. Brewer, 451 F. Supp. 50, 53 
(E.D. Tenn. 1978); Eleventh Circuit, United States v. Pritchard, 973 F.2d 905, 909 
(11th Cir. 1992); D.C. Circuit, United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1209 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980); and United States v. Pettiford, 238 F.R.D. 33, 41 (D.D.C. 2006); see also 1 
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D. An Inherent Flaw in the Mahone Framework 
Soon after Mahone was decided, a handful of commentators identified 
an apparent flaw in the five-factor framework that, while initially 
amounting to little more than an intellectual curiosity, ultimately would 
have a significant negative impact on the federal courts’ application of 
Rule 609.  Commentators noted that Mahone’s fourth and fifth factors, 
“the importance of the defendant’s testimony” and “the centrality of the 
credibility issue,” not only lacked explicit legislative authorization,111 
but also could not be applied in a “principled” manner.  In essence, the 
factors cancel each other out.112  To the extent a defendant’s testimony 
is “important” (for example, if the defendant is the key defense 
witness), his credibility becomes “central” in equal degree, leading to a 
curious equipoise.  If the defendant’s testimony is less important (for 
example, where other witnesses could provide similar testimony), his 
credibility becomes less significant, again creating a standstill with 
respect to the fourth and fifth factors.  Thus, the fourth and fifth Mahone 
factors seemed to have no practical significance at all, existing in a 
rough state of equipoise that prevented either factor from impacting the 
 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 11, § 42, at 187 n.10; 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, 
supra note 60, § 609.05[3][a], at 609-36 to -39.  Because the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit does not review criminal cases, there is no case law 
regarding impeachment of criminal defendants in that circuit. 
Similar or identical five-factor tests are also applied in many state jurisdictions that 
are governed by evidentiary analogues to Rule 609.  See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 668 
A.2d 8, 14 (Md. 1995) (highlighting Mahone factors as “a useful aid to trial courts in 
performing the balancing exercise mandated by” Maryland law); Settles v. State, 584 
So. 2d 1260, 1264 n.2 (Miss. 1991) (noting adoption under Mississippi law of “five 
factor list enunciated by the federal courts for Rule 609 determinations”); State v. 
Lucero, 648 P.2d 350, 352-53 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982) (relying on Mahone and Luck for 
factors to apply under New Mexico law, leading to so-called State v. Lucero factors); 
State v. McClure, 692 P.2d 579, 590-91 (Or. 1984) (applying Mahone factors in review 
of evidentiary ruling under Oregon law); Theus v. State, 845 S.W.2d 874, 880 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1992) (reciting Mahone factors for analysis under Texas law, leading to so-
called Theus factors). 
 111 See supra Part III.C. 
 112 Ordover, supra note 109, at 199 (noting that fourth and fifth factor “are linked”; 
“[w]here the defendant has important factual information to give, he should be 
encouraged to testify . . . [h]is credibility then, of course, becomes a major issue.”); 
Surratt, supra note 62, at 943, 945 (observing that “it appears that as one of these 
factors increases in importance in a particular case, so does the other” and “there 
appears to be no principled way to determine which factor should prevail”); 
Impeachment, supra note 88, at 662 (recognizing that fourth and fifth factors give no 
clear answer in any case “where the witness is the defendant in a criminal trial” 
because “the more important the defendant’s testimony, the more apt credibility will 
be central to the resolution of the issues”). 
  
2008] Circumventing Congress 319 
overall impeachment calculus.113  Although this conundrum has been 
recognized by two state courts in jurisdictions that adopted the Mahone 
framework,114 it has yet to be acknowledged in the federal courts.115 
IV. MODERN APPLICATION OF THE FIVE-FACTOR FRAMEWORK 
At the same time that the federal courts were assimilating the 
Mahone framework as the primary rubric for evaluating the 
admissibility of prior conviction impeachment, the Supreme Court 
sent shockwaves through the procedural landscape to which the 
framework applied.  As discussed below, it was the procedural ruling 
of Luce v. United States116 that, by exacerbating the flaws in the Mahone 
framework, ultimately severed the already attenuated connection 
between the framework and the congressional intent (embodied in 
Rule 609) that the framework purported to apply. 
 
 113 See Surratt, supra note 62, at 942-45. 
 114 See Settles, 584 So. 2d at 1264 (asserting that fourth and fifth factors “tend to 
offset each other” because “as the importance of the witness’ testimony tends to rise so 
does the centrality of the credibility issue”); McClure, 692 P.2d at 591 (recognizing 
that “factors (4) and (5) . . . usually offset”).  California state courts, relying directly 
on Gordon, developed a four factor framework that omits the fifth Mahone factor, and 
downplays the importance of the fourth, which the courts characterize as “what effect 
admission would have on the defendant’s decision to testify.”  See People v. Castro, 
696 P.2d 111, 118 (Cal. 1985); People v. Beagle, 492 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972) 
(emphasizing that trial courts should use “caution” in relying on fourth factor so that 
defendant cannot “blackmail” court in order to obtain “a false aura of veracity”).  It 
appears that the drafters of the Oregon Evidence Code similarly merged the fourth 
and fifth Mahone factor into one factor favoring exclusion of impeachment in 
providing commentary to that Code, but the Oregon courts have deemed this 
commentary to be “in error” and rely on Mahone for the traditional five-factor 
framework.  See McClure, 692 P.2d at 585 (noting that “the commentary, referring to a 
four-factor test contained in Gordon v. United States . . . is partially in error” because 
“[i]n Gordon, Judge Burger set forth five factors to be considered by trial courts in 
admitting evidence” and reciting and applying factors as set forth in Mahone). 
 115 There are, however, at least two federal district courts that have explicitly 
recognized that, in the case being considered (“in this case”), the factors cancelled 
out.  See Cueto, 506 F. Supp. at 14 (“Factors four and five seem to counterbalance 
each other in this case.  While Defendant’s testimony may be of some importance, a 
factor favoring nonadmission, at the same time his credibility may be a central issue in 
this case, a factor favoring admission.”); Brewer, 451 F. Supp. at 54 (same). 
 116 469 U.S. 38 (1984). 
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A. Luce v. United States Transforms Appellate Review of Impeachment 
Rulings 
The Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Luce v. United States 
concerned a mere question of appellate procedure that, ostensibly, had 
nothing to do with the substantive application of Rule 609.  In a brief, 
almost cursory, opinion, the Court held that henceforth, “to raise and 
preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a prior 
conviction, a defendant must testify.”117  The Court based this ruling 
(an exercise of its supervisory authority over the federal judiciary) on 
practicality, contending that:  (i) if the defendant did not testify, it is 
impossible to properly evaluate the district court’s in limine (i.e., 
pretrial)118 impeachment ruling because to do so, a “court must know 
the precise nature of the defendant’s testimony”; (ii) an in limine 
ruling is, by definition, an interim, not a final, ruling that can be 
changed at any time (e.g., after the defendant testifies on direct 
examination) or be rendered moot (e.g., by the defendant’s decision 
not take the witness stand or by the prosecution’s decision to forgo the 
contested impeachment); and (iii) there is no way for a reviewing 
court to determine if the trial court’s ruling, if erroneous, constituted 
“harmless error” when a defendant does not testify because “a 
reviewing court cannot assume that the adverse ruling motivated a 
defendant’s decision not to testify.”119 
Although barely touched on by the Supreme Court in its opinion, 
the holding of Luce had two implications for the impeachment of 
testifying defendants, one widely recognized, and the other seemingly 
unnoticed.  The obvious implication was that Luce insulated from 
review a broad set of impeachment rulings — those where the 
defendant declined to testify after an adverse in limine ruling.  Thus, 
the very cases that constituted the paradigm concern of pre-Rule 609 
District of Columbia Circuit case law and the resulting fourth Mahone 
factor, where the district court’s ruling deprived “the jury [of] the 
benefit of the defendant’s version of the case,”120 became unreviewable 
after Luce.121 
 
 117 Id. at 43. 
 118 An “in limine” ruling is more precisely a ruling on a “motion, whether made 
before or during trial, to exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence” (or to permit 
potentially objectionable evidence) “before the evidence is actually offered.”  Id. at 40 
n.2.  The term in limine itself simply means “[o]n or at the threshold; at the very 
beginning; preliminarily.”  Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979)). 
 119 Id. at 41-43. 
 120 Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Luck v. United 
States, 348 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (emphasizing that in deciding whether to 
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The second, unheralded implication of the Luce decision was that it 
subtly but irrevocably altered the context of appellate Rule 609 
challenges.  Prior to Luce, appellate courts regularly considered the 
propriety of impeachment evidence in the context of challenges to 
pretrial in limine rulings.122  After Luce, appellate courts could no 
longer entertain such challenges.  Appellate evaluation of in limine 
impeachment rulings became improper (even when not procedurally 
barred) because, as the Supreme Court emphasized in Luce, the in 
limine ruling:  (i) is not the final word on impeachment,123 and (ii) 
takes place before the trial court is presented with crucial information 
in the form of the defendant’s direct examination testimony.124  Thus, 
 
permit impeachment, district court must consider “above all, [the] extent to which it 
is more important to the search for truth in a particular case for the jury to hear the 
defendant’s story than to know of a prior conviction”). 
 121 Interestingly, although Chief Justice Burger had, as a circuit judge, authored 
Gordon, his five-page opinion in Luce fails to reference any of the themes recognized 
in that case or the other D.C. Circuit cases regarding the problematic nature of prior 
conviction impeachment of an accused.   
 122 At the time the Supreme Court decided Luce, all but one of the federal circuits 
that had addressed the issue (six explicitly and four implicitly) had determined that in 
limine rulings on the admissibility of prior convictions were reviewable on appeal even 
if the defendant did not testify.  See United States v. Washington, 746 F.2d 104, 106 
n.2 (2d Cir. 1984) (collecting cases); cf. Luce, 469 U.S. at 40 & n.3 (recognizing that 
“[s]ome other Circuits have permitted review in similar situations”).  The sole 
exception was the Sixth Circuit in a case that the Supreme Court ultimately reviewed, 
resulting in the Luce decision.  See Washington, 746 F.2d at 106 n.2. 
 123 Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758 n.3 (2000) (noting that “in limine 
rulings are not binding on the trial judge, and the judge may always change his mind 
during the course of a trial”); Luce, 469 U.S. at 41-42 (“Even if nothing unexpected 
happens at trial, the district judge is free, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, 
to alter a previous in limine ruling.”); United States v. Turner, 960 F.2d 461, 465 (5th 
Cir. 1992) (affirming district court’s admission of prior convictions as impeachment 
despite earlier in limine ruling excluding convictions). 
Justice Brennan, concurring in Luce, emphasized that the opinion did not resolve 
the “broader questions of appealability vel non of in limine rulings that do not involve 
Rule 609(a).”  Luce, 469 U.S. at 44 (Brennan, J., concurring).  But see United States v. 
Bond, 87 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “courts have refused to limit Luce 
to Rule 609(a) cases and have instead applied its principles to analogous contexts”). 
 124 Ohler, 529 U.S. at 758 (emphasizing that prosecution need not “make its 
choice” as to whether to impeach defendant “until the defendant has elected whether 
or not to take the stand in her own behalf and after the Government has heard the 
defendant testify”); Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 & n.5 (emphasizing that trial court’s 
impeachment ruling depends on “the precise nature of the defendant’s testimony,” 
which cannot be obtained from mere “proffer of testimony” because “trial testimony 
could, for any number of reasons, differ from the proffer”); United States v. 
Williams, 939 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 1991) (reflecting that “Luce teaches that the 
admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment depends to a great extent on the 
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even when a defendant testifies and subsequent appellate review of an 
impeachment ruling is permitted, it is not the pretrial in limine ruling 
(if any)125 that is at issue.  Rather, the question on appeal is the 
propriety of the trial court’s ruling during the defendant’s cross-
examination.  It is only then, after sitting through the defendant’s 
direct examination testimony and learning “the precise nature of 
th[at] testimony,” that the court makes its final dispositive ruling 
either permitting or precluding a prosecutor’s effort to impeach the 
defendant with prior convictions.126 
B. The Fourth and Fifth Mahone Factors Escape From Equipoise 
Although not recognized in the Luce opinion (or any subsequent 
federal court opinions), the Supreme Court’s shift of the salient 
decision point for prior conviction impeachment rulings was not 
merely procedural.  Rather, it had far reaching implications for the 
substantive application of the Mahone framework. 
By transferring the appellate courts’ focus from pretrial in limine 
decisions to midtrial cross-examination rulings, Luce had the most 
 
nature of the defendant’s testimony”). 
 125 See United States v. Martinez, 76 F.3d 1145, 1151-52 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding 
that trial court could properly decline to rule on admissibility of defendant’s prior 
conviction until after hearing defendant’s testimony). 
 126 Luce, 469 U.S. at 41 (stating that had defendant “testified and been impeached 
by evidence of a prior conviction, the District Court’s decision to admit the 
impeachment evidence would have been reviewable on appeal” because reviewing 
court “would then have . . . a complete record detailing the nature of [the defendant’s] 
testimony, the scope of the cross-examination, and the possible impact of the 
impeachment on the jury’s verdict”); United States v. Griffin, Nos. 85-1992, 85-2003, 
1988 WL 9164, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 9, 1988) (refusing to review trial court’s in limine 
ruling because defense introduced prior conviction on defendant’s direct examination 
and “the trial court was entitled to evaluate the probative value and prejudicial effect 
of the prior conviction under the actual circumstances which developed at trial”); cf. 
United States v. Mejia-Alarcon, 995 F.2d 982, 987 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that 
defendant must renew objection raised in in limine motion when impeachment is 
actually offered at trial or objection is forfeited, because “any final determination as to 
admissibility under Rule 609(a)(1) rests on a balancing . . . that could only properly 
be performed after an assessment of the evidence that had come in up to the point of 
its admission”). 
The Supreme Court’s extension of Luce in Ohler is consistent with this analysis.  In 
Ohler, the Court held that a defendant also cannot challenge the admission of prior 
conviction impeachment if, after an adverse in limine ruling, the defense introduces 
the evidence itself on direct examination to “remove the sting” of the impeachment.  
Ohler, 529 U.S. at 758, 760.  In such circumstances, the district court is deprived of 
the opportunity to rule on the admissibility of the impeachment during the 
defendant’s cross-examination, and no appellate review is permitted. 
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direct impact on the fourth Mahone factor — “the importance of the 
defendant’s testimony.”  This factor, as originally intended, is rendered 
meaningless in the wake of Luce.  At the time of the trial court’s cross-
examination ruling, the defendant has already testified on direct 
examination and the question underlying the fourth factor as posited 
in Gordon — “what the effect will be if the defendant does not testify 
out of fear of being prejudiced because of impeachment by prior 
convictions”127 — is moot.128  Even if the trial court considers the 
defendant’s testimony to be of critical importance to the jury, it no 
longer follows that impeachment should be rejected on that ground.  
The jury will hear the defendant’s testimony (in fact, has already heard 
that testimony) regardless of whether the trial court admits the 
impeachment for use in cross-examination. 
Luce’s impact on the Mahone framework is not limited to its 
neutralization of the previously anti-impeachment fourth factor.  As 
discussed in Part III.D, supra, before Luce the fourth Mahone factor 
served the dual purpose of a generic anti-impeachment consideration 
and a check on the fifth Mahone factor — “the centrality of the 
credibility issue.”  By neutralizing the fourth factor, the Luce decision 
freed the fifth factor from this countervailing force. 
In fact, as subsequent federal case law would demonstrate, Luce’s 
procedural holding not only released the fifth Mahone factor from 
equipoise but also pushed it to center stage.  After Luce, the now-
controlling impeachment ruling comes at a time (the defendant’s 
cross-examination) when the “credibility issue” always appears 
 
 127 Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-41 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
 128 See WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, § 6134, at 234 n.67 (recognizing that “[t]he 
Supreme Court’s decision in Luce v. U.S., . . . logically precludes future consideration” 
of fourth Mahone factor because “the federal courts cannot consider the loss of 
evidence if the defendant does not testify since the issue of admissibility cannot be 
raised unless he takes the stand”).  In fact, the Luce decision only limits appellate 
review of district court rulings, theoretically leaving the lower courts’ impeachment 
analysis unaffected.  Thus, a district court is free, after Luce, to indulge a defendant 
with an in limine impeachment ruling and, in so ruling, could also apply the fourth 
Mahone factor as originally intended — considering the potential detriment to the 
jury’s effort to determine the facts if the defendant is deterred from testifying.  
However, this is increasingly unlikely because, as discussed in Part IV.B, infra, the 
appellate courts have not simply discarded the fourth Mahone factor in response to 
Luce, but reinterpreted it.  Inevitably, then, in applying the fourth factor going 
forward, district courts will adopt the meaning given to that factor in the appellate 
opinions that bind them, even though the district courts are not themselves 
constrained by the procedural ruling (Luce) that animates the appellate courts’ 
analysis.  See cases cited infra note 159 (listing cases that illustrate district courts’ 
adoption of fourth factor as reinterpreted by appellate courts). 
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paramount.  By taking the witness stand, the defendant has “place[d] 
himself at the very heart of the trial process,”129 transforming the trial 
into a “credibility contest” with the jury required to choose between 
the defendant’s version of the facts and that of the prosecution 
witnesses.130  The prosecution can forcefully argue in such 
circumstances that the fifth Mahone factor virtually dictates admission 
of the defendant’s prior convictions so that the jury is allowed, in the 
words of the Gordon court, to “explor[e] all avenues which would 
shed light on which of the . . . witnesses was to be believed.”131 
In sum, Luce’s subtle alteration of the context for appellate review of 
impeachment rulings had a remarkably unsubtle effect on the Mahone 
framework.  Luce replaced the preexisting standoff between the fourth 
and fifth factors with an inherent, pro-impeachment imbalance. 
C. Post-Luce Application of the Fourth and Fifth Mahone Factors 
The procedural ruling in Luce provided a perfect opportunity for the 
federal courts to revisit the aging Mahone framework.  At the very 
least, the courts could have explained how a framework designed to 
evaluate pretrial rulings could continue to function in light of Luce’s 
procedural change.  The federal courts, however, declined to avail 
themselves of this opportunity.  To date, they have failed to articulate 
any resolution of the tension between Luce and the Mahone 
framework. 
In fact, in a case decided shortly after Luce, the Seventh Circuit was 
directly confronted with, but failed to address, the inherent 
contradiction between Luce and Mahone’s fourth factor.132  In that case, 
United States v. Doyle, the defendant declined to testify after an in limine 
ruling that he could be impeached with prior burglary, attempted 
murder, and federal weapons offenses.133  On appeal, the defendant 
contended that “because of [the trial court’s] ruling he did not testify at 
trial, fearing the prejudicial results his . . . felony convictions would 
have on the jury,” and that the trial court erred “by failing to take into 
account the importance of the defendant’s testimony [(Mahone’s fourth 
factor)] when permitting the use of the prior convictions.”134  The 
Seventh Circuit summarily rejected the defendant’s argument, without 
 
 129 Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 283 (1989). 
 130 Gordon, 383 F.2d at 938. 
 131 Id. at 941. 
 132 United States v. Doyle, 771 F.2d 250, 251 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 133 Id. at 254.   
 134 Id. 
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reference to the Mahone framework, on the ground that it “flies in the 
face of [Luce] and therefore must fail.”135 
Doyle’s refusal to take on the inconsistency between Luce and 
Mahone foreshadowed the federal courts’ ultimate approach to this 
issue.  Rather than altering or abandoning the Mahone framework in 
response to Luce, the courts, without fanfare or explanation, simply 
sidestepped the shockwaves of the Supreme Court’s ruling.  To 
accomplish this, the courts retained the venerable Mahone framework 
but reinterpreted the fourth and fifth Mahone factors to fit within a 
post-Luce procedural reality. 
The most striking aspect of the federal courts’ post-Luce 
reinterpretation of the Mahone framework is their transformation of 
the fourth Mahone factor, “the importance of the defendant’s 
testimony.”  Relying on the latent ambiguity of the factor’s phrasing, 
and hamstrung by the post-Luce procedural context in which prior 
conviction impeachment challenges now arise, the federal courts 
simply reversed the fourth factor’s meaning. 
Prior to Luce, the importance of a defendant’s testimony favored 
exclusion of impeachment.  As explained in Gordon, prior convictions 
could be excluded whenever “it is more important that the jury have 
the benefit of the defendant’s version of the case than to have the 
defendant remain silent out of fear of impeachment.”136  After Luce, 
however, the federal courts began to apply this fourth Mahone factor 
not to preclude impeachment, but to support its admission.  In a 
bizarre and as yet unexplained reversal, the courts began to emphasize 
the necessity for prior conviction impeachment precisely because the 
defendant’s direct examination testimony was “important,” “crucial,” 
“central,” “critical” or, most poignantly, “of utmost importance.”137  
Thus, in United States v. Montgomery, the Seventh Circuit defended the 
district court’s admission of the defendant’s six prior convictions by 
asserting that the court “correctly recognized that even if some of the 
 
 135 Id. (“The defendant’s argument flies in the face of the Supreme Court’s most 
recent decision on the use of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), and therefore must 
fail.” (citing Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984))). 
 136 Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940; see 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 60, § 
609.05[3][e], at 609-43 to -44; supra Part III.B. 
 137 See United States v. Montgomery, 390 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(“central role of [defendant’s] testimony”); United States v. Smith, 131 F.3d 685, 687 
(7th Cir. 1997) (“crucial”); United States v. Toney, 27 F.3d 1245, 1253 (7th Cir. 
1994) (“of utmost importance”); United States v. Nururdin, 8 F.3d 1187, 1192 (7th 
Cir. 1993) (“critical”); United States v. Sides, 944 F.2d 1554, 1560 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(“important”); United States v. Perkins, 937 F.2d 1397, 1406 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(“central”). 
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Mahone factors were neutral or favored exclusion, the central role of 
[the defendant’s] testimony and the importance of his credibility 
strongly favored the admission of his prior convictions.”138  Similarly, 
the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Nururdin, affirmed the 
admission of a defendant’s prior convictions “in light of the critical 
nature of [the defendant’s] testimony and credibility”;139 declared, in 
United States v. Smith, that impeachment was proper because “the 
defendant’s testimony was a crucial part of the case”;140 and 
emphasized, in United States v. Toney, the propriety of impeachment 
on the ground that “[t]he defendant’s testimony was of utmost 
importance.”141  The same sentiment controlled in United States v. 
Sides, where the Tenth Circuit asserted that the admission of the 
defendant’s prior convictions was supported by the fact that “both the 
defendant’s testimony and credibility were important”;142 and also in 
United States v. Perkins, where the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
admission of prior conviction impeachment because the “defendant’s 
credibility and testimony were central to the case, as [he] took the 
stand and testified that he did not commit the robbery.”143 
This transformation of the fourth Mahone factor from an anti- to a 
pro-impeachment consideration is perhaps most strikingly 
demonstrated in United States v. Alexander.144  In Alexander, the 
defendant ineptly attempted to convince the Ninth Circuit that his 
convictions should have been excluded because “his [own] trial 
testimony was not particularly important.”145  Failing to acknowledge 
the irony of this contention coming from a defendant who proclaimed 
his innocence at trial, the Ninth Circuit summarily rejected it, stating 
that when “a defendant takes the stand and denies having committed 
the charged offense, he places his credibility directly at issue,” thus 
triggering “the related fourth and fifth [Mahone] factors” in favor of 
admitting the impeachment.146 
 
 138 Montgomery, 390 F.3d at 1016. 
 139 Nururdin, 8 F.3d at 1192. 
 140 Smith, 131 F.3d at 687. 
 141 Toney, 27 F.3d at 1253. 
 142 Sides, 944 F.2d at 1560. 
 143 United States v. Perkins, 937 F.2d 1397, 1406 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 144 48 F.3d 1477, 1489 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. (emphasis added); see also United States v. Thomas, 79 F. App’x 908, 914 
(7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting defendant’s contention “that the fourth and fifth factors 
weigh against admissibility because his testimony was unimportant and his credibility 
was not at issue” on ground that defendant’s “denial that he robbed the banks was 
directly contradicted by the testimony of numerous eyewitnesses identifying him as 
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As illustrated by these cases and numerous others,147 the federal 
courts continue post-Luce to rely on Mahone’s fourth factor — whether 
the defendant’s testimony is “important” to the jury.  Now, however, 
they rely on the fourth factor to support admission of prior convictions 
rather than exclusion.148  Of course, interpreting the fourth factor in 
 
the robber” and “[t]he government therefore was entitled to impeach his veracity with 
the fact that he is a convicted felon”). 
 147 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 369 F.3d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 
2004) (affirming district court ruling permitting impeachment with prior conviction 
even though trial court “did little more than ‘recognize[] the centrality of the 
credibility issue and the defendant’s testimony’” in justifying its ruling (quoting 
United States v. Jimenez, 214 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2000))); United States v. 
Cuevas, 82 F. App’x 546, 547 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that defendant’s prior 
“conviction was . . . admissible under Rule 609(a)(1) because it reflects on [his] 
veracity and is dissimilar to the charged conduct, and because [his] testimony and 
credibility were critical at trial”); Thomas, 79 F. App’x at 914 (holding that fourth and 
fifth factors did not prevent government’s use of prior convictions to impeach 
defendant’s testimony denying guilt in bank robbery); United States v. Cannady, No. 
95-50207, 1995 WL 216942, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 1995) (affirming district court’s 
admission of defendant’s convictions because “the only factor weighing against 
admission of the two prior convictions was the similarity factor” and emphasizing that 
defendant’s “credibility and testimony were central to the case on such issues as 
motive to commit the robbery”); United States v. Coon, No. 89-1489, 1991 WL 
37830, at *6 (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 1991) (emphasizing propriety of impeachment because 
defendant’s “testimony, if believed, constituted a complete defense to the charge”); 
United States v. Rein, 848 F.2d 777, 783 (7th Cir. 1988) (district court’s findings that 
“the defendant’s testimony was important” and “the defendant’s credibility was 
‘extremely important’” supported admission of prior drug trafficking conviction 
despite similarity of prior offense to charges at trial); United States v. Browne, 829 
F.2d 760, 764 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasizing “the importance of the defendant’s 
testimony” in upholding admission of prior convictions for impeachment); see also 
cases cited infra note 160. 
 148 See Blume, supra note 5, at 11 (criticizing federal courts “[e]ngaging in what 
would seem to be complete anti-logic” by treating importance of defendant’s 
testimony as factor favoring impeachment); Ordover, supra note 109, at 199-200 
(“Where the defendant’s testimony is crucial to the defendant, one might expect that 
the courts would give serious attention to the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing test that places 
the burden on the prosecution and favors the defense.  Yet, what seems to occur is 
that courts will acknowledge that the defendant’s evidence is important; that 
credibility is the central issue; and, therefore, the prior conviction must be admitted to 
impeach the defendant’s credibility.  This is the opposite of the policy expressed by 
the line of authority that led to the adoption of Rule 609(a).”); Ed Gainor, Note, 
Character Evidence by Any Other Name . . . :  A Proposal to Limit Impeachment by Prior 
Conviction Under Rule 609, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 762, 783 (1990) (noting that there 
“appears to be confusion among some courts regarding the weight to be given to the 
importance of the defendant’s testimony in the balancing process,” and “some courts 
appear to have weighed the importance of the defendant’s testimony in favor of 
admissibility of prior conviction evidence”). 
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this manner is indefensible in light of its opposite meaning in the case 
law from which it is derived.149 
In addition, while fitting neatly into the post-Luce procedural 
paradigm, the retooled fourth factor is essentially meaningless as an 
analytical consideration.  Under the post-Luce federal case law, the 
courts are engaging in a tautological two-step:  (i) whenever a 
defendant testifies and (as is to be expected) either contradicts 
government witnesses or denies guilt, his testimony is deemed 
“important”; and (ii) the importance of this testimony ipso facto 
justifies prior conviction impeachment.  The rhetorical force of this 
reasoning appears to have blinded the courts to the fact that it 
represents a generally applicable policy argument rather than a means 
of evaluating the probative value and prejudicial effect under Rule 609 
of a particular conviction in a particular case.  The courts’ strained 
logic dictates that the fourth Mahone factor will always apply when a 
defendant testifies (or seeks to testify) and always favors 
impeachment.  In effect, the courts have taken what was once a factor 
to be applied in weighing the admissibility of proffered impeachment 
and used it to transform the Rule 609 balance itself. 
Not all the federal courts have been able to swallow the rhetorical 
reversal of the fourth factor exemplified by the Alexander decision.  
Some have adopted a more subtle approach to post-Luce interpretation 
of the Mahone framework that avoids the awkwardness of a complete 
reversal of the fourth Mahone factor, but results in essentially the same 
judicial tinkering with the Rule 609 balance.  The courts following this 
alternative generally list the five Mahone factors in setting forth the 
familiar framework for review of impeachment rulings, but then 
decline to apply the fourth factor, implicitly assuming that it is 
inapplicable on the facts of the case (as it is, if properly construed, in 
every post-Luce appeal).  These courts then highlight the fifth factor 
(“the centrality of the credibility issue”) as the primary consideration 
in the analysis, without acknowledging that this factor, as now 
interpreted, will always support the admission of prior convictions.150 
 
 149 See United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir. 1976) (citing Gordon 
as source of fourth factor); Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940-41, 941 n.11 
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (announcing that trial court should consider “what the effect will be 
if the defendant does not testify out of fear of being prejudiced because of 
impeachment by prior convictions” and “whether the defendant’s testimony is so 
important” that otherwise admissible impeachment should be foregone to encourage 
its presentation to jury); supra Part III.B. 
 150 For examples of this approach, see discussion in text, infra Part IV.C. and 
United States v. Arhebamen, 197 F. App’x 461, 467 (6th Cir. 2006) (listing Mahone 
factors, and then affirming ruling that, despite availability of four other convictions as 
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For example, in United States v. Brito,151 after briefly discussing the 
first three Mahone factors, the First Circuit bypassed the fourth factor 
to seize on the fifth as justification for admitting the defendant’s three 
prior convictions.  The court explained that “[p]erhaps most 
important, this case hinged on a credibility choice; the jury had to 
decide whether to believe the appellant or the police officers” and 
consequently “[t]he salience of the credibility issue weigh[ed] in favor 
of admitting the prior convictions.”152  This analysis produces the 
same effect as in Alexander — essentially combining the fourth and 
fifth factors into one predominant factor present in every case that will 
always favor the admission of impeachment. 
 
impeachment under 609(a)(2), conviction for “absconding” was admissible because 
“even though it was similar to the charged crime of failure to appear for sentencing,” 
conviction “was highly probative because Defendant’s credibility was a central issue at 
trial”); United States v. Ramirez-Krotky, 177 F. App’x 746, 749 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(affirming admission of impeachment on principal ground that defendant’s “credibility 
was a central question”); United States v. Gant, 396 F.3d 906, 909-10 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(recognizing “the importance of the defendant’s testimony” as Mahone’s fourth factor, 
but ignoring it in application and ruling that because defendant’s “testimony that he 
possessed a pipe, not a firearm, directly contradicted the testimony of [the] 
government witnesses,” defendant’s “credibility was a crucial part of the trial” and 
thus “[t]he district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting [the] prior 
conviction for impeachment purposes”); United States v. Hernandez, 106 F.3d 737, 740 
(7th Cir. 1997) (reciting five Mahone factors and affirming without reference to fourth 
factor despite similarity of prior crime to charged offense “given the importance of the 
credibility issue in this case”); United States v. Blackburn, No. 92-1131, 1993 WL 
204241, at *2 (6th Cir. June 8, 1993) (listing factors and affirming admission of prior 
conviction where “district court dealt with several of these factors” but not fourth 
factor and “[a] central issue at trial was which witness to believe, the defendant or [a 
prosecution witness]”); and United States v. Moore, 917 F.2d 215, 234-35 (6th Cir. 
1990) (reciting five Mahone factors, but ignoring fourth factor and affirming 
admission of prior armed robbery conviction based on trial court’s findings that “the 
probative value of the nine-year conviction outweighed any prejudicial effect since 
[the defendant’s] credibility was ‘very much in contention’” and because “[t]he prior 
conviction went to credibility, and had impeachment value”); see also Rodriguez v. 
United States, 286 F.3d 972, 984 (7th Cir. 2002) (determining by reference to Mahone 
factors that defense counsel reasonably advised defendant his prior convictions would 
be admissible if he took stand, and emphasizing – while ignoring fourth factor – that 
prior conviction was “an important factor in determining [the defendant’s] credibility 
if he took the stand” and thus “the prior conviction’s probative value for determining 
credibility would outweigh its prejudicial value for his propensity to commit the 
charged crime”). 
 151 427 F.3d 53, 64 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 152 Id. at 64. 
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D. Implications of the Modern Application of the Five-Factor Framework 
As the preceding discussion makes clear, it is not the congressional 
policy directive that the Mahone framework purports to implement, 
but rather the Mahone framework itself that best explains why courts 
applying Rule 609 routinely permit prior conviction impeachment of 
criminal defendants.  Regardless of the facts of the case or the nature 
of the prior conviction(s), support for the admission of impeachment 
can always be found by reference to the “related” fourth and fifth 
Mahone factors.153  In effect, these last two judicial factors establish a 
legal presumption of the admissibility of a testifying defendant’s prior 
convictions, despite the fact that the text of Rule 609 supports, if 
anything, the opposite presumption.154 
This pro-impeachment presumption (i.e., the presence of two always 
applicable, one-sided considerations in every impeachment calculus) is 
 
 153 See, e.g., Brito, 427 F.3d at 64 (ignoring fourth factor and highlighting fifth as 
“[p]erhaps most important” of court’s considerations in affirming admission of 
impeachment); United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 369 F.3d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 
2004) (affirming district court ruling permitting impeachment with prior conviction 
even though trial court “did little more than ‘recognize[] the centrality of the 
credibility issue and the defendant’s testimony’” in justifying its ruling). 
There is an almost imperceptible ripple against this tide in the federal case law as 
evidenced by a handful of cases addressing the exclusion of convictions under Rule 
609(b) — a provision of the Rule that prohibits impeachment with a prior conviction 
over 10 years old unless the probative value of the conviction “substantially 
outweighs” its prejudicial effect — but this contrary sentiment has not yet triggered 
any recognition of the flaws in the modern interpretation of the Mahone framework.  
See United States v. Bensimon, 172 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1999) (recognizing 
that “this and other courts have held that the probative value of impeachment 
evidence is enhanced where the defendant’s testimony is pitted against that of the 
government witnesses, thereby making the credibility of the defendant an important 
issue,” but ruling that “while [the defendant’s] credibility was certainly an important 
issue to the government’s case, this fact does not change the probative value of [his] 
seventeen-year-old conviction for mail fraud”); Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Am. 
President Lines, Ltd., 44 F.3d 774, 779 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting challenge to 
exclusion of prior conviction impeachment of witness in civil case despite assertion 
that witness’s credibility was “critical” to case, because “the probative value of [the 
witness’s] conviction is measured by how well it demonstrates his lack of 
trustworthiness, not how badly [the other side] wants to impeach him”); United States 
v. Acosta, 763 F.2d 671, 695 (5th Cir. 1985) (acknowledging in 609(b) context that 
“the mere fact that the defendant’s credibility is in issue” is weak justification for 
permitting impeachment because it is “a circumstance that occurs whenever the 
defendant takes the stand”). 
 154 See United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stressing 
that “there can be no legal presumption of admissibility”; “[t]o the contrary, . . . the 
burden is on the government to show that the probative value of a conviction 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant”); discussion supra Part II.B. 
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particularly powerful because the balance of the Mahone factors will rarely 
be decisive.  The courts have long accepted that all felony convictions are 
somewhat probative of dishonesty (factor one),155 and need only have 
occurred within roughly the past decade to “satisfy” the remoteness 
criteria (factor two).156  Thus, these first two factors are essentially place 
holders in the impeachment analysis — mere checkboxes that the courts 
tick off on their way to an almost inevitable conclusion.  The sole 
significant obstacle to admissibility, then, is the third Mahone factor, in 
the circumstance where the prior offense and pending charge are the 
same or substantially similar.  This obstacle, even when present, however, 
is easily overcome.  The case law is replete with statements to the effect 
that such similarity is “not dispositive.”157  Consequently, factors four and 
five, which are essentially merged into a conglomerate super-factor 
representing “the importance of the defendant’s credibility,” hold great 
 
 155 Brito, 427 F.3d at 64 (asserting that all felony convictions “have some probative 
value for impeachment purposes”); Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1062 (“[A]ll felony 
convictions are probative of credibility to some degree.”); see also supra Part I. 
 156 See United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1488 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing 
that second factor was “satisf[ied]” because 10-year period from release had not 
elapsed as per Rule 609(b)); United States v. Pritchard, 973 F.2d 905, 909 (11th Cir. 
1992) (affirming district court’s admission of 13-year-old burglary conviction despite 
similarity to charged crime based on “the government’s need for the impeaching 
evidence” and fact that “crux of this case was a credibility issue”); United States v. 
Walker, 817 F.2d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1987) (evaluating remoteness of prior conviction 
by stating that it “was within the ten-year time limit prescribed by this rule”); see also 
FED. R. EVID. 609(b) (prescribing stricter balancing test with respect to impeachment 
of any witness “if a period of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the 
conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that 
conviction” (whichever is later); admission is prohibited “unless the court determines, 
in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported by 
specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect”). 
 157 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 106 F.3d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(acknowledging that similarity of prior conviction to charged offense was “a factor 
that requires caution” but concluding that it was outweighed by “the importance of 
the credibility issue in this case”); Alexander, 48 F.3d at 1488 (stating prior conviction 
was “‘not inadmissible per se, merely because the offense involved was identical to 
that for which [the defendant] was on trial,’” rather “[w]hat matters is the balance of 
all five factors”); United States v. Cannady, No. 95-50207, 1995 WL 216942, at *2 
(9th Cir. Apr. 11, 1995) (affirming admission of two prior convictions despite fact 
that “similarity factor” “weigh[ed] against admission,” because defendant’s “credibility 
and testimony were central to the case”); United States v. Causey, 9 F.3d 1341, 
1344 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that substantial similarity of prior conviction to charged 
offense and limited impeachment value while “important factors” were “not 
dispositive”); Beaver & Marques, supra note 4, at 616 (noting prevalence of rulings 
allowing defendants to be impeached with crimes similar to charged offense). 
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sway as ready-made and rhetorically compelling considerations favoring 
the admission of impeachment in every case.158 
While the prospects for criminal defendants seeking to exclude prior 
convictions under the current case law are bleak in the trial court,159 
 
 158 This point is neatly summed up by United States v. Perkins, 937 F.2d 1397, 1406 
(9th Cir. 1991), which explains that “the admission under Rule 609 of a bank robbery 
conviction in a bank robbery trial is not an abuse of discretion when the conviction 
serves a proper impeachment purpose, such as when the defendant’s testimony and 
credibility are central to the case.”  See also Martinez-Martinez, 369 F.3d at 1088 
(affirming district court ruling permitting impeachment with prior conviction even 
though trial court “did little more than ‘recognize[ ] the centrality of the credibility 
issue and the defendant’s testimony’” in justifying its ruling). 
 159 In line with the natural passage of legal principles from the appellate courts to 
the trial courts, it is no surprise that the federal district courts have adopted the flawed 
analysis that first emerged in post-Luce Rule 609 appellate case law.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Dismuke, No. 07-81, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 7, 2007) (applying Mahone 
factors in written ruling on in limine motion, and ruling four prior convictions 
admissible, in part, because “defendant’s testimony and credibility would be important 
in this case” and consequently jury will “be called upon to make a determination of 
his credibility, which may be the critical issue in the case”); United States v. Hearn, 
No. 06-30040, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 4, 2006) (concluding based on substance of 
defendant’s proposed testimony that “fourth factor weighs in favor of admitting 
evidence of the drug convictions” for impeachment); United States v. Grimes, No. 05-
30161, slip op. at 2 (S.D. Ill. June 2, 2006) (“agree[ing] with the Government’s 
assertions as to the importance of [the defendant’s] testimony and the centrality of the 
credibility issues” and that these factors favor admission of impeachment because his 
“testimony will likely become a central issue in this case”); United States v. Vargas, 
No. 05-20007, slip op. at 5 (C.D. Ill. May 31, 2006) (reciting five Mahone factors and 
ruling that impeachment was proper because, inter alia, “there is no dispute that 
Defendant’s testimony will be important in this case and that Defendant’s credibility 
will be the central issue if Defendant elects to testify”); Commonwealth v. Taitano, 
No. 01-017, slip op. at 7 (N. Mar. I. Dec. 14, 2005) (“The fourth and fifth factors are 
the importance of appellant’s testimony and his credibility.  If a defendant’s credibility 
is the central issue of a case, ‘a greater case can be made for admitting the 
impeachment evidence, because the need for the evidence is greater.’”); United States 
v. Chesteen, No. 03-20036, slip op. at 4-5 (W.D. Tenn. June 23, 2003) (discussing in 
limine ruling permitting impeachment where, after listing five factors, court notes that 
“[f]rom all indications . . . [defendant] will deny knowledge of the drug 
manufacturing activities in his house if he takes the stand” and consequently 
“[e]vidence of [defendant’s] prior drug convictions would be particularly relevant and 
probative as impeachment evidence”); Crocker v. Dretke, No. 7:01-087-R, slip op. at 6 
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2003) (concluding in evaluating petition for writ of habeas corpus 
that “the fourth and fifth factors would have weighed in favor of admitting the . . . 
prior convictions” because when defendant “profess[es] his innocence” “importance 
of the defendant’s testimony and his credibility escalates as does the need for the State 
to be afforded the opportunity to impeach his credibility”); United States v. Jackson, 
No. 95-155, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 1995) (concluding in in limine ruling that 
“the importance of [the defendant’s] testimony makes the issue of his credibility 
equally critical and supports the admission of potentially impeaching evidence”); see 
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they become even less promising on appeal.  Appellate courts review 
impeachment rulings under the deferential “abuse of discretion” 
standard160 and, as noted above, the Mahone framework itself 
guarantees that any ruling permitting impeachment will be supported 
by at least two of the five Mahone factors.  Thus, even when review is 
available,161 appellate courts rarely side with the defendant.162  At both 
 
also supra note 128. 
 160 See Lipscomb, 702 F.2d at 1068 n.69 (“[A]ll [circuits] agree that the ultimate 
standard of review under Rule 609(a)(1) is whether the district court has abused its 
discretion.”). 
 161 As discussed in Part IV.A, supra, the Luce decision precludes review, much less 
reversal, whenever the defendant is deterred from testifying by potential 
impeachment. 
 162 A rough survey of appellate case law evaluating post-Luce district court rulings 
admitting defendants’ prior convictions under Rule 609(a) reveals only one case (a 
particularly extreme case at that) during the 13-year span in which a federal appeals 
court concluded that a district court abused its discretion by admitting a prior 
conviction.  See United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1473 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(holding trial court abused its discretion in admitting remote conviction for heroin 
trafficking in heroin trafficking prosecution where defendant could be alternatively 
impeached with prior perjury conviction and trial court “considered expressly only 
two of the five factors” and “[a]s to one of the factors it considered, the district court 
incorrectly assumed that the similarity of the prior conviction and the present charges 
weighed in favor of admissibility”).  I was able to locate 47 reported post-Luce 
appellate opinions that reached the merits of such trial rulings.  In 45 of the cases, the 
appeals courts concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting 
challenged convictions.  In one other case, the appeals court found no error in the 
admission of the defendant’s conviction, but nevertheless concluded that the district 
court erred when it made a bungled effort to “sanitize” the conviction by ordering it 
referred to as a “felony involving a firearm.”  United States v. Jimenez, 214 F.3d 1095, 
1096, 1099 (9th Cir. 2000) (reversing because trial court’s “attempt to ameliorate the 
prejudice of the assault with a deadly weapon conviction” by referring to it as “felony 
involving a firearm” had “the reverse effect”; court’s “ruling inadvertently exacerbated 
[the prejudice] by gratuitously informing the jury that the ‘deadly weapon’ involved in 
the defendant’s prior conviction was, indeed, a firearm”; and “the main issue in the 
present case was whether or not the defendant possessed a firearm”); see also 4 
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 60, § 609.23, at 609-65 (noting that appellate courts 
“generally affirm the trial court’s determination as long as there is some indication 
that the trial court exercised its discretion by weighing the probative value of the prior 
conviction against its prejudicial effect”); WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, § 6134, at  
241 (emphasizing that in most cases, where trial courts “at least claimed” to have 
“considered both probative value and prejudice” “appellate courts usually defer to the 
decision of the trial court if there is any way to rationalize the balance struck”); 
Nichol, supra note 4, at 397 (arguing that “appellate review of” rulings permitting 
credibility impeachment “has been limited to cursory determinations that no abuse of 
discretion has occurred”); Perrin, supra note 1, at 656 (asserting that under federal 
case law, defendants challenging “the admission of [a] prior conviction on appeal” are 
often “met with a narrow, half-hearted application of Rule 609(a)(1) and a near 
certain affirmance”); Gainor, supra note 148, at 780 (arguing that “[f]ederal courts of 
  
334 University of California, Davis [Vol. 42:289 
the trial and appellate level, the Mahone framework is now better 
understood as a means of justifying the admission of impeachment, 
rather than as a mechanism for determining whether that 
impeachment is proper in the first place. 
One of the more surprising aspects of the federal courts’ failure to 
faithfully implement the congressional policy directive embodied in 
Rule 609 is the absence of dissent.  The sweeping judicial 
transformation of prior conviction impeachment law, most appreciable 
in the post-Luce era, has engendered little controversy in either 
appellate opinions or scholarly literature.  Instead, the federal courts 
and most commentators have simply accepted the post-Luce 
approaches to the Mahone framework without comment.  This creates 
an anomalous circumstance where the courts continue to apply a body 
of case law that not only cannot be defended, but for which no one 
(scholar or judge) has even bothered to articulate a rationale. 
From a separation of powers perspective, the courts’ modern prior 
conviction impeachment case law represents the fruit of a perfect 
(institutional) crime.  Despite congressional action in the 1970s to 
require federal courts to severely restrict prior conviction 
impeachment of the accused, the courts have steered persistently back 
toward their traditional pro-impeachment jurisprudence.  Now, with a 
fortuitous assist from the Supreme Court’s procedural ruling in Luce, 
the federal courts have arrived, full circle, back at the law in effect 
prior to the enactment of Rule 609.163  But for the occasional citation 
to Rule 609 itself, one would suspect that the Rule had been 
rescinded.164 
This de facto invasion of the legislative sphere is not merely a matter 
of intellectual concern, but has grave real world implications.  The 
unavoidable result of federal case law that now essentially dictates 
admission of prior convictions is twofold.  First, defendants in 
criminal courts across the country are deterred from testifying based 
 
appeals have rarely reversed a trial judge’s decision to admit evidence of prior 
convictions for impeachment”). 
 163 Cf. Gold, supra note 1, at 2298, 2325 (contending that in interpreting Rule 609, 
“the courts have substituted their own political judgments for those of Congress” and 
because of careful congressional consideration received by Rule 609, this improper 
judicial application of Rule “not only distorts the notion of judicial discretion but also 
inappropriately intrudes upon legislative domain”). 
 164 Beaver & Marques, supra note 4, at 591 (arguing that despite passage of Federal 
Rules, “[p]rior crime impeachment of criminal defendants continues essentially 
unabated”); Nichol, supra note 4, at 394, 399 (stating that despite “academic fervor” 
criticizing practice, prior conviction impeachment of criminal defendants has been 
“largely unabated under the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence”). 
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on erroneous rulings (or anticipated rulings) as to the admissibility of 
their prior convictions.  Second, many of those who do testify suffer 
devastating prejudice from the introduction of past crimes that Rule 
609 should exclude. 
These consequences of the federal courts’ over-admission of prior 
convictions do not inhere solely to criminal defendants, but serve, in 
particular cases, to undermine the reliability and legitimacy of the 
criminal justice system itself.165  As the District of Columbia Circuit 
recognized decades ago, the cause of justice suffers when defendants 
with important stories to tell are deterred by the prospect of 
impeachment from presenting their testimony to the jury.166  Further, 
the recent wave of post-conviction, DNA-based exonerations has laid to 
rest any claim that American jury trials are immune to serious error.167  
This reality counsels that courts should decrease, not increase, their 
reliance on a form of evidence that American jurisprudence has long 
recognized as exacerbating the potential for wrongful convictions.168  Of 
course, these concerns for the proper functioning of the criminal justice 
system motivated Congress to enact Rule 609 in the first instance.  
Thus, it is no surprise to see the same concerns resurface when the 
courts, in essence, put the Rule out to pasture. 
V. AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR APPLYING 
RULE 609 
The silver lining in the rather glum assessment of the federal case 
law described in Parts III and IV is that unlike many criminal 
procedure dilemmas, the solution, or at least an interim solution, is 
readily apparent:  the federal courts can simply discard Mahone’s 
 
 165 See Bellin, supra note 49, at 854-59 (discussing how criminal justice system 
suffers when large numbers of defendants decline to testify); Alexandra Natapoff, 
Speechless:  The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1450-51 
(2005) (explaining that defendant testimony “has personal, dignitary, and democratic 
import beyond its instrumental role within the criminal case” as well as “systemic 
implications for the integrity of the justice process”). 
 166 Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 & n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
 167 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56 
(2008) (reporting results of empirical study of 200 post-conviction DNA exonerations 
in rape and murder cases, and noting that these results provide strong counterpoint to 
famous suggestion of Judge Learned Hand that “‘the ghost of the innocent man 
convicted’” is an “‘unreal dream’”). 
 168 See Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 482 n.11 (1972); Blume, supra note 5, at 17-19  
(analyzing data regarding defendants cleared by post-conviction DNA testing and 
determining that in 39% of those cases defendant did not testify, and 43% of those 
who did testify were subject to impeachment with prior convictions); supra Part I. 
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antiquated five-factor framework.  Replacement of the five-factor 
inquiry with a direct focus on the legislative history and text of Rule 
609 is easily preferable to the status quo. 
The creation of an alternative analytical framework to govern the 
application of Rule 609 is a more complicated issue.  While it is 
tempting to conclude that the federal courts’ erroneous interpretation 
of Rule 609 can be remedied by simply lopping off the fourth and fifth 
Mahone factors, that solution would likely result in only incremental 
change.169  The federal courts’ failure to faithfully interpret Rule 609 
may stem not only from flaws in the fourth and fifth Mahone factors, 
but also from a methodological flaw inherent in the courts’ reliance on 
a malleable, multi-factored analytical framework.  Stated another way, 
it may be that simply by shifting the focus from the straightforward 
balancing test set forth in Rule 609(a)(1) to an amorphous litany of 
non-specific factors, the analytic exercise devolved, almost inevitably, 
into something of a Rorschach test.  The federal courts, steeped in a 
long pre-Rule 609 tradition of automatically admitting the felony 
convictions of testifying witnesses, were generally able to locate 
support for admission of impeachment somewhere in the multi-
factored analysis, even when Congress would have intended the 
opposite result.  Thus, while there are undoubtedly serious substantive 
flaws in the fourth and fifth Mahone factors, the excision of these 
factors would leave more subtle underlying flaws untouched.  A three-
factor Mahone framework, like its five-factored antecedent, would 
permit the courts to revert to a pattern of routinely admitting prior 
convictions regardless of the ultimate balance of probative value and 
prejudicial effect. 
A more promising avenue for reintroducing the courts to the text of 
Rule 609 is to set aside Mahone’s multi-factor analysis entirely.  
Starting on a clean slate unencumbered by the Mahone factors, a trial 
court, evaluating the admissibility of a defendant’s prior convictions as 
impeachment, could focus on the task at hand:  identifying the aspects 
of each conviction and the facts of the particular case that could 
potentially justify the counterintuitive conclusion that a prior 
conviction’s “probative value” as impeachment outweighs its 
“prejudicial effect to the accused.”170 
First, focusing on a conviction’s probative value, the trial court must 
recognize that the defendant’s credibility as a witness is always minimal, 
even without impeachment evidence.  Consequently, the first question 
 
 169 This is the approach suggested by one early commentator.  See Surratt, supra 
note 62, at 950-51. 
 170 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). 
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under Rule 609 is not whether a prior conviction has some relevance as 
impeachment, but rather:  what will the introduction of the defendant’s 
prior conviction add to the jury’s evaluation of the defendant’s testimony?  
For a conviction to be considered more than marginally probative under 
this analysis, its evidentiary significance must be based on something 
more than a speculative “readiness to do evil.”  That consideration is 
easily subsumed by the more compelling fact of the defendant’s abiding 
interest in acquittal.  Rather, the analysis must rest on the specific facts 
of the case or of the conviction itself.  For example, a conviction would 
be more than marginally probative when the defendant, on direct 
examination, attempts to create an impression of having led a law 
abiding life (i.e., trying to appear as “a Mother Superior”);171 makes 
some claim that is directly inconsistent with the existence of a prior 
conviction (e.g., “I have never seen drugs before in my life,” or “I am 
not a crook”); or where the defense utilizes prior convictions to 
impeach government witnesses, creating a false contrast between the 
defendant and his accusers.172 
With respect to the prejudice inquiry, the trial court should ask a 
similar case-specific question, recognizing that the admission of the 
defendant’s prior offenses as impeachment will virtually always result in 
some “prejudicial effect to the accused.”173  Specifically, the court must 
inquire:  why is the prejudicial effect of the prior conviction diminished (or 
enhanced) in this case?  A diminished risk of prejudice might be present 
when a relatively minor conviction (e.g., theft) is offered to impeach a 
defendant charged with a dissimilar and significantly more serious 
crime (e.g., murder); where the evidence introduced at trial has already 
identified the defendant as a prior offender (e.g., a crime committed in 
prison); or where the defendant’s prior conviction will be admitted for 
other purposes (e.g., to establish an element of the offense).  In contrast, 
in circumstances where prejudicial effect is unusually high, such as 
where a prior conviction is for an identical or particularly infamous 
crime (e.g., child molestation), the trial court must begin with a 
presumption of inadmissibility under Rule 609 due to the sheer 
 
 171 United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (MacKinnon, 
J., concurring specially); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 11, § 42, at 198 
(“Most prosecutors argue forcefully that it is misleading to permit the accused to 
appear as a witness of blameless life, and this argument has prevailed widely.”). 
 172 The defense had, in fact, impeached a key government witness with a prior 
conviction in Gordon, perhaps triggering the amorphous reasoning in that case that 
led to the centrality of the credibility issue factor.  Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 
936, 938-39 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see also United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 
(7th Cir. 1976) (funneling Gordon’s analysis into five-factor framework). 
 173 FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1). 
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implausibility that the probative value of such evidence could ever 
outweigh its prejudicial effect.174 
In the vast run of cases, where the above analysis does not reveal 
any case-specific factors that enhance a proffered felony conviction’s 
probative value and diminish its prejudicial effect, Rule 609 dictates 
exclusion.  A straight comparison of:  (i) the prejudicial effect of the 
jury’s learning of a defendant’s criminal past; against (ii) the probative 
value of informing the jury that the defendant has slightly less 
credibility than his status as an interested party already suggests, 
strongly favors exclusion, particularly in light of the fact that the 
burden of persuasion lies with the prosecution.175 
 
 174 Application of this presumption would dictate that the severe prejudice 
inherent in a prior conviction of this type could not be overcome by weak 
countervailing considerations such as that the conviction is recent or because the 
defendant’s credibility is important.  See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 106 F.3d 
737, 740 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that similarity of prior conviction to charged 
offense was “a factor that requires caution,” but concluding that factor was 
outweighed by “the importance of the credibility issue in this case”); United States v. 
Walker, 817 F.2d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1987) (concluding that prior arson conviction 
was admissible because it “was within the ten-year time limit prescribed by this rule, 
and [the defendant’s] credibility was an important factor in the case”); see also 
WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, § 6134, at 232 (noting that prejudice will be high 
“[i]f the crime involved particularly depraved and offensive acts, such as wanton 
violence or sexual immorality”). 
Similar or infamous offenses could be rendered less prejudicial as impeachment if 
“sanitized” so that they are referred to at trial in a generic fashion (e.g., a “prior 
felony” rather than a “prior child molestation conviction”).  Sanitizing convictions to 
render them admissible is not contemplated by the text of Rule 609, however.  See 
United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing 
“overwhelming weight of authority” for proposition that under Rule 609, “inquiry 
into the ‘essential facts’ of the conviction, including the nature or statutory name of 
each offense, its date, and the sentence imposed is presumptively required” although 
“subject to balancing under Rule 403”); WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, § 6134, at 
224 (noting that admitting only “mere fact” of generic felony conviction is difficult to 
reconcile “with the language and structure of Rule 609”); see also FED. R. EVID. 609(a) 
(referencing Rule 403 with respect to admission of convictions for all witnesses except 
criminal defendants).  Consequently, sanitizing a conviction to omit its nature or 
statutory name (absent agreement of the parties) is more properly viewed as an 
application of Rule 403 (not Rule 609) and, as such, should be undertaken only after a 
trial court determination that the conviction is admissible under Rule 609. 
 175 In addition, the trial courts may, under Rule 609, consider the fourth Mahone 
factor (in its original incarnation) — the significance to the trier of fact if the 
defendant is deterred from testifying by the prospect of impeachment.  The 
“prejudicial effect” in such cases is the notable absence of the defendant’s side of the 
story from the evidence presented at trial.  See United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 
173 (1st Cir. 1977) (analyzing legislative history of Rule 609, and concluding that 
“Congress plainly felt that justice in certain cases would be advanced if the defendant 
was not demoralized from taking the stand by fear that a prior conviction would 
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While it is miles from the current state of the federal case law, the 
analytical approach emphasized here is by no means revolutionary.  
Soon after the enactment of Rule 609, an analogous approach was 
suggested by the en banc Ninth Circuit, which stated, in long-since 
discarded dicta, that “[n]ormally the court should err on the side of 
excluding a challenged prior conviction, with a warning to the 
defendant that any misrepresentation of his background on the stand 
will lead to admission of the conviction for impeachment purposes.”176   
While the case-specific analysis suggested above (much like the 
Ninth Circuit’s now quaint sounding dicta) may seem to tilt the 
balance against the admission of impeachment of the vast bulk of 
criminal defendants’ convictions, this is merely a reflection of the text 
of Rule 609.  The Rule requires exclusion of most convictions (i.e., 
those not rendered automatically admissible as crimen falsi) when 
their prejudicial effect is equivalent to or infinitesimally greater than 
probative value, and places the burden on the prosecution to establish 
 
overshadow the positive aspects of his testimony”); Bellin, supra note 49, at 890-96 
(arguing that district courts should consider value of defendant’s testimony to 
factfinder in ruling on, inter alia, admission of prior conviction impeachment, and 
contending that courts possess authority under existing law to exclude impeachment 
on this ground).  Of course, this final consideration is solely relevant at the pretrial 
stage of the proceedings (where the defendant has not yet testified) and thus would 
not come into play in cases where a trial court reserves ruling until the defendant’s 
cross-examination, and will also be inapplicable (per Luce) on appeal.  For a 
discussion of how the significance of this factor would vary based on the defendant’s 
proposed testimony in any particular case, see Bellin, supra note 49, at 895. 
 176 United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), 
disapproved on other grounds by Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.3 (1984) 
(recognizing that where defendant intended to “palm himself off as a peace-loving 
member of the American Friends Service Committee with interest in prison reform 
and social protest,” trial court was understandably unwilling to force “the government 
to sit silently by, looking at a criminal record which, if made known, would give the 
jury a more comprehensive view of the trustworthiness of the defendant as a 
witness”); see also United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir. 1985) (ruling 
that district court abused its discretion in admitting impeachment (pre-Luce) because, 
in part, “the record is devoid of any evidence that [the defendant] intended to 
misrepresent his character or to testify falsely as to his prior criminal record” and 
“[t]hus, the impeachment value of [the] prior robbery convictions was quite low”).  
The relatively anti-impeachment Cook decision, which was decided five years prior to 
Luce, presents a vivid contrast with the Ninth Circuit’s more recent pro-impeachment 
rulings.  See United States v. Martinez-Martinez, 369 F.3d 1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Alexander, 48 F.3d 1477, 1489 (9th Cir. 1995).  The last federal 
citation to the Cook dicta quoted in the text appears in a 1981 (pre-Luce) case in the 
Seventh Circuit.  See United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083, 1092 (7th Cir. 1981) 
(citing Cook for “general rule” that “a court should err on the side of excluding a 
challenged prior conviction”). 
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the counterintuitive proposition that this balance favors admission in 
particular cases.  The analysis proposed above recognizes this reality; 
the federal courts’ current analytical framework does not. 
CONCLUSION 
While reasonable people can disagree (and have for decades) about 
the policy merits of the practice of impeaching criminal defendants 
with prior convictions, there can be no dispute, given the tremendous 
significance of such impeachment, that federal courts must 
scrupulously adhere to the policy ultimately chosen by Congress.  
Unfortunately, this has not been the case.  Instead, the modern federal 
case law lends a prophetic air to the District of Columbia Circuit’s 
warning, in a case decided shortly after Rule 609’s enactment, that 
judicial balancing under the Rule “must not become a ritual leading 
inexorably to admitting the prior conviction into evidence.”177  That is 
precisely what has occurred.  A flawed, judicially created analytical 
framework has supplanted the text of Rule 609 as the governing legal 
standard for prior conviction impeachment and, in so doing, has 
decisively skewed the impeachment calculus in favor of admitting 
prior convictions. 
Despite this indictment of the modern federal case law, there are no 
villains in this story.  The courts do not appear to have consciously 
undermined Congress based on a competing policy preference.  
Instead, judges simply succumbed to the incurious application of a 
long-established body of case law that, over time, came to rest on a 
decayed foundation.  Indeed, it is likely that the exceedingly gradual 
decay of the Mahone framework’s underpinnings contributed to its 
remarkable ability to avoid both judicial and scholarly scrutiny.178 
Motives aside, once the requisite analytical scrutiny is applied, it 
becomes clear that the five-factor Mahone framework can no longer be 
justified in light of the vast chasm separating that framework from the 
 
 177 United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 178 An analogous unintentional, but nevertheless flawed, evolution of federal case 
law is depicted in Richard Posner’s book, How Judges Think.  Judge Posner chronicles 
the evolution of an erroneous formula employed by numerous federal courts in 
interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act.  Posner explains that “[b]ecause so many 
cases had recited” the formula it became “natural for lawyers and judges to treat it as 
gospel”; the phrases used by earlier courts were “garbled,” the “garbled form repeated, 
and the original meaning forgotten.”  RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 243-44 
(2008).  Posner goes on to urge that judges remain “alert to the possibility that a 
current legal doctrine may be a mere vestige of historical circumstances and should be 
discarded.”  Id. at 247-48. 
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legislative intent it purports to implement.179  By circumventing Rule 
609, application of the Mahone framework constitutes a raw exercise 
of judicial power that has improperly altered, and continues to alter, 
the course of countless criminal trials.180  To stanch the bleeding, the 
federal courts must recognize the flaws in their current approach to 
Rule 609 and devise a new way forward.  The first, and by far the 
easiest, step on this path is to abandon the antiquated Mahone 
framework.  The courts must then develop a new analytical framework 
derived, not from the pre-Rule 609 case law, but, as suggested in 
Part V, supra, from the text of the Rule itself. 
 
 179 Cf. supra Part II (summarizing legislative intent); supra Parts III-IV (critiquing 
framework). 
 180 See supra Part IV. 
